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INTRODUCTION
Woody Allen and Mia Farrow were never married. When they
separated, Allen sought custody of their children. Because their
custody dispute was not a matrimonial matter, it should have been
heard in New York Family Court. Family Court hears child abuse
and neglect, juvenile delinquency, paternity, and other matters
such as Persons in Need of Supervision (i.e. "incorrigible chil-
dren"'). New York Family Court is the court of pro se clients, the
court where people wait all day for their cases to be called, the
court where there are no paper towels in the public bathroom. It is
the court that most lawyers avoid even if someone can pay them to
take their case. But Allen, through his Manhattan attorneys, actu-
ally filed his custody petition in Supreme Court.2 In New York's
Supreme Court, he would have the opportunity to take depositions
and to have a multi-day trial utilizing the rules of evidence. He
would also be issued a written opinion, formally written by a judge,
instead of one that is typed (or handwritten) on a boilerplate form
at the end of the hearing. There would also be paper towels in the
public restroom at Supreme Court.
How and why was Allen able to get his case in to Supreme
Court, even though jurisdictionally, since it was not a matrimonial
matter, it belonged in Family Court? The author is actually unable
to find how, exactly, Allen achieved this procedural impossibility,
because the file is sealed.3 The trial court's 33-page opinion," as
1 A Person in Need of Supervision (PIN) is defined by the Family Court Act as: "A
person less than eighteen years of age who does not attend school . . . or who is
incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient[.]" N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 712 (Mc-
Kinney 2014). Citywide in 2001, the most common allegations on PINS petitions were
incorrigible behavior. ERIC WEINGARTNER ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, A STUDY OF
THE PINS SYSTEM IN NEW YORK CITY: RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 8 (2002), http://
archive.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/159_243.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JWU3-2EWQ].
2 "Supreme Court" is the trial-level court of general jurisdiction in the New York
State Unified Court System. It is vested with unlimited civil and criminal jurisdiction.
See generally N.Y. CT. R. §§ 202.1-.70. In most states, this is known as "Circuit Court."
3 See Bruce Weber, Woody Allen Files Child-Custody Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14,
1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/08/14/nyregion/woody-allen-files-child-cus-
tody-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/RT9B-EW2K] ("Details of the suit, which was
filed in State Supreme Court in Manhattan, were not known, because the court or-
dered the papers sealed."); see also Farrow v. Allen, 608 N.Y.S.2d 57 (App. Div. 1993)
(Mem.) ("Motion to seal the records is granted."). Opinions are available on Westlaw
and Lexis, but not court filings. The original trial court opinion from Supreme Court
is Allen v. Farrow, No. 68738/92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 7, 1993). The appellate opinions
are Allen v. Farrow, 626 N.Y.S.2d 125 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Allen v. Farrow, 611
N.Y.S.2d 859 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
4 Allen v. Farrow, No. 68738/92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 7, 1993).
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well as the appellate decisions,5 mention only that the matter came
to Supreme Court as "a special proceeding."6 But the reason he
(and his attorneys) wanted to be in Supreme Court instead of Fam-
ily Court is clear. By all measures, it is a higher status court.
This article explores the history and implications of a two-
tiered system for adjudicating matrimonial-as opposed to non-
matrimonial-custody matters. As the author uncovered by calling
every clerk's office in every major city in the country, matrimonial
matters are under a different jurisdiction or part of court in nine
states.' This differential treatment has implications for the out-
come of private custody cases. It also reflects a bias in the adminis-
tration of justice, based on race and socioeconomic class. Perhaps
most importantly, it causes the government and other outside par-
ties (such as court appointed guardians ad litem) to be more in-
volved in the private lives of poor families and families of color
than they are with middle and upper-middle class families.
Part I of the article discusses the demographics of marriage
rates, showing that the majority of unmarried parents with custody
disputes are poor and/or are people of color. This is in contrast to
married parents with custody disputes, who are more likely to be
white and middle or upper middle class. Part II starts by exploring
the history behind the two-tiered system for adjudicating matrimo-
nial versus non-matrimonial custody matters, and then describes
the current lay of the land. Part II also paints a picture of the cul-
5 Allen v. Farrow, 626 N.Y.S.2d 125 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Allen v. Farrow, 611
N.Y.S.2d 859 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
6 "In the underlying special proceeding herein, commenced in August of 1992,
petitioner sought to obtain custody of, or procure increased visitation with, the infant
children ..... Allen v. Farrow, 626 N.Y.S.2d 125, 126 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). "In this
special proceeding commenced by petitioner to obtain custody of, or increased visita-
tion with, the infant children . . . we are called upon to review the IAS Court's deci-
sion . . . ." Allen v. Farrow, 611 N.Y.S.2d 859, 860 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). The author
surmises that Allen was able to get the matter into Supreme Court by filing a writ of
habeas corpus. See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 70(a) (McKinney 1988). According to sub-
section (a) of the statute, "Where a minor child is residing within this state, either
parent may apply to the supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus to have such minor
child brought before such court; and on the return thereof, the court, on due consid-
eration, may award the natural guardianship, charge and custody of such child to
either parent for such time, under such regulations and restrictions, and with such
provisions and directions, as the case may require, and may at any time thereafter
vacate or modify such order." Dom. REL. LAW § 70(a). Prior to state laws regarding
child custody and the development of the "domestic relations exception" in federal
court, this was also a way to get a matter regarding custody of a child before a federal
court. See Paul J. Buser, Habeas Corpus Litigation in Child Custody Matters: An Historical
Mine Field, 11 J. Am. AcAD. MATRIM. LAW. 1, 3-4 (1993).
7 See Appendix, infra.
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ture of Family Courts throughout the country.8 Part III is an over-
view of the substantive nature of private child custody cases,
including the best interest standard and the use of guardians ad
litem. Part IV takes two states, New York and Virginia, to show how
jurisdictional difference manifests itself in practice in private child
custody cases. Part V concludes that our country's family law "sys-
tem" is reflective of bias against poor families and families of color.
The jurisdictional differences between matrimonial and non-matri-
monial custody cases are not based on the best interests of the
child and should be eliminated. All custody matters in every state
should be heard by the same level of state court.
I. DEMOGRAPHICS OF MARRIAGE AND PARENTHOOD IN 2016
Marriage is a very different institution, in most respects, than it
was less than a century ago. According to recent data from the Cen-
ters for Disease Control, 40.2% of all births in 2014 were to unmar-
ried women.' The percentage of non-marital births varies widely
among ethnic groups; among black mothers, the non-marital birth
rate is 70.9%, in contrast to the non-marital birth rate among
whites, which is 29.2%.o Among Hispanics it is 52.9%, and Native
Americans, 65.7%." Parents of color make up the vast majority of
non-married parents.
Among Mrican American men, the differences are extreme.
Of all male populations, a black father is the least likely to be mar-
ried to the mother of his children." There are numerous institu-
tional explanations for this, which are beyond the scope of this
article. Black men are six times more likely than white men to be
incarcerated, 4 and Black men's underemployment may also de-
8 The term "Family Court" is used throughout the article to mean the courts that
hear child dependency, delinquency, custody, paternity, Child/Person in Need of Su-
pervision (CHINS/PINS) and other matters. As discussed throughout this article,
some of these courts also hear divorce, but many family courts do not have jurisdic-
tion over divorce matters.
9 Brady E. Hamilton et al., Births: Final Data for 2014, NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP. Dec.
2015, at 1, 2, 7, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr64/nvsr64_12.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XA4P-D5RD].
10 Id. at 40.
11 Id. at 40-41.
12 Id. at 41.
13 Id. at 7.
14 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED
NATIONS HuMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED
STATES CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2013), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/12/Race-and-Justice-Shadow-Report-ICCPR.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V5ME-Q65C].
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crease their ability and desire to get married."5
The rate of marriage also varies across socioeconomic
groups. 6 It has been steadily declining among the less educated
for decades, creating a class divide.17 A 2011 study by the Pew Re-
search Center found that, although 64% of college-educated Amer-
icans were married, fewer than 48% of those with some college or
less were married." "In 1960, the report found, the two groups
were about equally likely to be married."' 9
In other words, educated, high-income adults are still mar-
rying at high rates, but lower income adults are not. In fact, only
women in the top 10% of Americans in earnings saw their marriage
rates increase between 1970 and 2011, whereas women in the bot-
tom 65% in earnings saw their marriage rate declining by more
than 20 percentage points.20 In the words of economist Justin
Wolfers, marriage has become "an indulgence" for the "well off."2 1
Numerous other studies have shown that, after marriage, both
women and men tend to be much better off financially than those
who are unmarried.2 2 The median income for single-mother fami-
lies is $25,493, just 31% of the $81,455 median income for two-
parent families.2 ' The poverty rate for children in single-parent
families is triple the rate for children in two-parent families. In
2011, 42% of single parent households experienced at least one
"hardship," such as unpaid rent or mortgage, phone disconnec-
tion, utility disconnection, and unmet medical and/or dental
15 See William Marsiglio & Mark Cohan, Contextualizing Father Involvement and Pater-
nal Influence: Sociological and Qualitative Themes, in FATHERHOOD: RESEARCH, INTERVEN-
TIONS AND POLICIES 75, 79-80 (H. Elizabeth Peters et al. eds., 2000).
16 Andrew L. Yarrow, Falling Marriage Rates Reveal Economic Fault Lines, N.Y. TIMES:
FIELD NOTES (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/fashion/wed
dings/falling-marriage-rates-reveal-economic-fault-lines.html [https://perma.cc/
E63C-P2N6].
17 Id.
18 Id. (citing D'VERA COHN ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., BARELY HALF OF U.S.
ADULTS ARE MARRIED - A RECORD Low 8 (2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/
files/2011/12/Marriage-Decline.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4LF-PTZ5]).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Claire Cain Miller, Marriage Rates Keep Falling, as Money Concerns Rise, N.Y. TIMES:
THE UPSHOT (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/upshot/for-the-
young-money-is-increasingly-trumping-marriage.html [https://perma.cc/A6EU-
39A5].
22 Yarrow, supra note 16.
23 LEGAL MOMENTUM, SINGLE PARENTHOOD IN THE UNITED STATES - A SNAPSHOT
(2014 EDITION) 2 (2014), https://www.legalmomentum.org/sites/default/files/re
ports/SingleParentSnapshot20l4.pdf [https://perma.cc/B25U-BFUR].
24 Id.
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needs.
All told, approximately 60% of children in this country living
in single-mother homes are impoverished.2 6 The Department of
Children and Families further estimates that, as of 2013, at least
one-third of all American children live without their biological fa-
thers present in the home, up from 22% in 1997. Moreover, the
federal government reports that the many of the one million par-
ents it serves through its Access and Visitation program are both
low-income and unmarried.2 8
Single parenthood is clearly on the rise, but only for those on
the bottom of the economic ladder. When single parents cannot
settle custodial matters on their own, they seek help from our jus-
tice system. They need custody, visitation, and child support or-
ders, but not property settlement and divorce decrees. There are
procedural and substantive implications to this difference which
we cannot overlook any longer.
II. STRUCTURE AND CULTURE OF FAMILY COURT
A. History
Before the mid-twentieth century, it was very difficult to obtain
a divorce in the United States.29 Divorces were only granted if one
of the parties was at "fault."o Because the grounds were so hard to
prove, case law regarding remedies developed slowly, if at all." The
"innocent" spouse would usually just get everything: the children,
25 Id.
26 Jacqueline Kirby, Single-Parent Families in Poverty, Hum. DEV. & FAM. LIFE BULL.,
Spring 1995, at 1, 1, http://www3.uakron.edu/schulze/401/readings/singleparfam.
htm [https://perma.cc/KN5G-EVBD].
27 OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & Hum. SERVS.,
ACCESS AND VISITATION GRANT PROGRAM: FY 2013 UPDATE 2 (2014), http://www.acf.
hhs.gov/sites/default/files/programs/css/fy2Ol 3avfinal_0515.pdf [https://perma.
cc/NS2S-66F4].
28 Id. at 1.
29 Jason L. Honigman, Uhat "No-Fault " Means to Divorce, 51 MICH. ST. B.J. 16, 16-17
(1972); see generally Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Marriage and Divorce: Changes
and Their Driving Forces 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Working Paper No.
2007-03, 2007), http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/papers/2007/wp07-
03bk.pdf [https://perma.cc/GD6K-GIHAN] (noting that many states did not elimi-
nate fault-based divorce until the mid-twentieth century).
30 W. Bradford Wilcox, The Evolution of Divorce, NAT'L AFF., Fall 2009, at 81, 81,
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20091229_WilcoxFall09.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ZT3T-DAU6] (explaining that Ronald Regan first enacted no-fault divorce
in California, and that the other states in the Union followed suit over the next 15
years).
31 Honigman, supra note 29, at 21-24.
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property, and alimony. 2 The appellate courts had little need to
address issues regarding the placement of children or parenting
abilities under this "winner take all" result.
No-fault divorces, which emerged in 1970," suddenly in-
creased the number of divorces and opened up a Pandora's box of
legal issues." The courts were now forced to separate "fault" from
child custody, child support, alimony, and property disposition.
Moreover, it quickly became clear that the issues of child custody
and child support were substantively and procedurally different
from dissolution of marriage, in that they required ongoing con-
tact and possible modification, at least until the child reached age
18.36 Principles of res judicata and contract law were upended.
Prior to the first no-fault divorce law, juvenile courts had al-
ready been established in all states to handle juvenile delinquency
and status offenses." In the early twentieth century, some states
decided that other children's issues, such as dependency, would be
heard in juvenile courts as well.' 9 By the 1970s, as divorce prolifer-
32 Raven C. Lidman & Betsy R. Hollingsworth, The Guardian Ad Litem in Child
Custody Cases: The Contours of our Judicial System Stretched Beyond Recognition, 6 GEO. MA-
SON L. REV. 255, 288 (1998).
33 Id. at 288-89.
34 California's Family Law Act of 1969-the first such statute-took effect in 1970.
See Wilcox, supra note 30, at 81 (explaining that California was the first state to allow
no-fault divorce).
35 See, e.g., Wilcox, supra note 30, at 81-82.
36 In all states custody and child support orders are modifiable until a child is 18.
See, e.g., 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 899 (2016) ("Orders in divorce pro-
ceedings as to the custody of minor children are not final in the sense that they are
not subject to change, but are, in their nature, interlocutory and subject to modifica-
tion at any future time during the lives of the parents and the minority of the children
37 For example, in all states child custody orders can be modified based on a
change in circumstance, up until a child is 18. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108
(2011). Spousal support matters can also be modified based on new circumstances,
e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109 (2001), and spouses retain the right to seek a new
spousal support order even after a final decree of divorce, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
107.1(D) (2016).
38 See generally Chauncey E. Brummer, Extended juvenile jurisdiction: The Best of Both
Worlds?, 54 ARK. L. REV. 777 (2002); Solomon J. Greene, Vicious Streets: The Crisis of the
Industrial City and the Invention ofJuvenile justice, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 135 (2003);
Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentenc-
ing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68 (1997).
39 See, e.g., GREGORY J. HALEMBA ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, OHIO
FAMILY COURT FEASIBILITY STUDY: SUMMARY OF MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (1997),
http://www.ncjj.org/pdf/OhioFCFeasibilitySummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5JQ-
VR5E] (footnotes omitted) ("The first evidence of this is in a 1912 enactment of the
New Jersey legislature which vested county juvenile courts with jurisdiction to hear
and determine all domestic relations disputes. Ohio followed in 1914 with a court
consolidation from the domestic relations side when their legislature passed a bill that
CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:203
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ated,40 some states subsumed all domestic matters into one court.
But other states kept divorce and its multiple issues separate from
all of the other child-related causes of action. 2 In those states, this
meant, for example, that juvenile and Family Courts decided cus-
tody matters regarding unmarried parents, while the traditional
trial courts decided matrimonial custody matters. 3
From the beginning, specialized Family Courts were different
from other courts because they were so informal. This is true
even though family and juvenile matters are often "quasi-crimi-
nal."45 For example, civil "findings" of abuse and neglect against
parents can strip a parent of physical and legal custody of a child;
an order terminating parental rights is considered the "death sen-
tence" of child welfare.46 A child adjudicated a "delinquent" is sub-
ject to imprisonment. Progressive-era legal reformer Reginald
Herbert Walker Smith reflected on the paradox:
[T] he domestic relations and juvenile courts . . . are rapidly
eliminating the traditional forbidding aspects of a criminal trial
created a Division of Domestic Relations in the Hamilton County Court of Common
Pleas with jurisdiction over divorce, alimony matters, delinquency, dependency, ne-
glected and crippled children, adults contributing to or tending to cause delinquency
or dependency, and failure to provide support. Although it was not labeled family
division or family court, the Cincinnati court's enhanced Domestic Relations Division
of the early 20th Century is most commonly credited with achieving the nation's first
family court consolidation.").
40 See generally Wilcox, supra note 30, at 81-82 (explaining that divorce became
much more common after the termination of fault requirements).
41 See Catherine J. Ross, The Failure of Fragmentation: The Promise of a System of Unified
Family Courts, 32 FAM. L.Q. 3, 13 (1998).
42 Id. at 9 (discussing that Pennsylvania does not have a unified family court).
43 Id. at 17 ("When the state legislature created the [New York] 'Family Court' in
1962, it excluded matrimonial and probate matters, including guardianship of minor
children, from that court's jurisdiction. Matrimonial matters, including divorce, an-
nulment and separation, are handled in Supreme Court, a higher status court than
family court, while the family court handles numerous related matters such as child
support and custody, visitation and domestic violence, as well as juvenile dependency
and delinquency.").
44 See, e.g., Leah A. Hill, Do You See Mat I See? Reflections on How Bias Infiltrates the
New York City Family Court-The Case of the Court Ordered Investigation, 40 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROBS. 527, 544-45 (2007).
45 See, e.g., How is aJuvenile Delinquency Case Different from a Criminal Case?, SUPERIOR
COURT OF CAL. CTY. OF L.A., http://www.lacourt.org/division/juvenile/JV0056.aspx
[https://perma.cc/LVE9-AAEC] (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
46 Stephanie N. Gwillim, Comment, The Death Penalty of Civil Cases: The Need for
Individualized Assessment & Judicial Education Men Terminating Parental Rights of Men-
tally Ill Individuals, 29 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 341, 344, 344 n.13 (2009). See generally
NAT'L DIST. ATT'Ys Ass'N & NAT'L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, STATUTORY
COMPILATION: PHYSICAL CHILD ABUSE PENALTIES (2013), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/
Physical% 20Child% 20Abuse% 20Penalties% 20Compilation% 202013% 20(3).pdf
[https://perma.cc/7U25-BJ8].
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by informality of procedure, by using the summons instead of
the arrest, by having the attending officers in plain clothes, and
by having the parties sit around a table with the judge instead of
standing in cages or behind bars, nevertheless the machinery of
the criminal law is more and more being used.4 7
Even as a proponent of specialized juvenile and family courts,
Smith could see the conundrum of adjudicating fundamental
rights, such as family integrity and liberty, using ambiguous stan-
dards of substantive and procedural due process.
B. Current Structure
Today each state's Family Courts use their own terms of art
and follow their own rules. 9 There is also wide disparity in how
Family Courts are organized and administered.o In many states,
even localities have their own practices and lingo." These differ-
ences are very unclear from the information that is available to the
public. 2 In fact, the only way the author was able to get the answer
to the simple question of whether unmarried parents file custody
47 REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR: A STUDY OF THE PRESENT DENIAL
OF JUSTICE TO THE POOR AND OF THE AGENCIES MAKING MORE EQUAL THEIR POSITION
BEFORE THE LAW WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE To LEGAL AID WORK IN THE UNITED
STATES 75 (1919).
48 The controversy over substantive and procedural due process in child-related
matters is beyond the scope of this article, but much has been written on the subject.
See, e.g., Jane M. Spinak. Reforming Family Court: Getting it Right Between Rhetoric and
Reality, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 11, 34-38 (2009).
49 See Appendix, infra.
50 See e.g., HALEMBA ET AL., supra note 39, at 3 ("There is wide diversity in the
jurisdictional inclusion of family courts, their operations, and the management struc-
ture within which they exist.").
51 For example, in the Richmond, Virginia Juvenile and Domestic Relations (JDR)
Courts, all petitions and motions are written on court forms, available online. In con-
trast, the bordering county of Henrico has an entirely different custody form, which
must be obtained in person. In Henrico any motions after the first petition must be
filed on Hernico's own "Miscellaneous Motion," also obtained at the courthouse. Un-
like JDR Courts in Central and Eastern Virginia, Fairfax County and Prince William
JDR in Northern Virginia use "Model Discovery." The examples of varied practices
and terminology in Virginia JDR courts are endless.
52 For example, the webpage for the Superior Court for Indianapolis, Indiana, says
that "[t]he Circuit and Superior Court exercise concurrent jurisdiction over all civil
issues[,]" and only notes that the Superior Court Civil Division handles "domestic
relations matters." Circuit and Superior Courts of Marion County: Maion Superior Court,
CIT OF INDIANAPOLIS & MARION Cm., http://www.indy.gov/eGov/Courts/Superior/
Pages/Home.aspx [https://perma.cc/4R73-SBFA] (last visited Nov. 13, 2016). The
webpage for the Circuit Court specifies that it hears civil matters only. Circuit and
Superior Courts of Marion County, CIT OF INDIANAPOLIS & MARION Cm., http://
www.indy.gov/eGov/Courts/Circuit/Pages/home.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z45C-
KNLZ] (last visited Nov. 25, 2016). Neither webpage notes a difference between mat-
rimonial or non-matrimonial matters.
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petitions in the same courthouse as married parents was by having
a research assistant call clerks' offices in every major city in every
state of the country." The research assistant actually had to call
two clerks' offices in most states, one in the "general" trial court
and one in the family/juvenile court or division. The results were
that in nine states-Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Tennessee, and Virginia-non-matri-
monial custody matters are separate from matrimonial matters."
In these nine states, this means that either the non-matrimonial
matters are heard in a separate division of the same level of court,
or they are heard in a juvenile/family court with an entirely differ-
ent jurisdictional mandate and court rules.
C. Common Themes
Family Courts" are notoriously known as the "stepchildren" of
the legal system." Family Courts share many physical commonali-
ties: they are often in crowded, dilapidated buildings with a perva-
sive sense of chaos." They also have normative similarities.
Courtrooms are informal; forms, instead of formal pleadings, are
used." There is also widespread use of non-legal professionals (so-
cial workers, psychologists) to "evaluate" and inform the court
about families and children." Lastly, civil and criminal issues and
consequences are intertwined within Family Courts.o A significant
53 For the results of these efforts, see Appendix, infra.
54 Id.
55 Again, in this article, the generic term "Family Court" refers to any court that
hears dependency, delinquency, custody, paternity, CHINS/PINS, and other juvenile
matters. Some of these "Family Courts" also hear cases involving divorce. But, as will
be discussed in Part III infra, many "Family Courts" do not have jurisdiction over mat-
rimonial matters.
56 Ross, supra note 41, at 3. See also Michel Marriott, Family Court Is Struggling with
Caseload, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/
15/nyregion/family-court-is-struggling-with-caseload-experts-say.html [https://per
ma.cc/4JP8-MYZE].
57 Id. at 5 ("Family courts in most states conjure up overcrowded facilities lacking
the veneer of civility, let alone majesty, whose chaotic site itself speaks volumes to the
frequently downtrodden and almost always traumatized families that pass through
them.").
58 Matthew I. Fraidin, Decision-Making in Dependency Court: Heuristics, Cognitive Bi-
ases, and Accountability, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 913, 972 (2013) ("[T]he use of 'form
orders' discourages reason-giving. These orders are primarily forms with check-boxes
and fill-in-the-blank spaces. Where space is allowed for explanation and reason-giving,
it is very limited.").
59 See Hill, supra note 44, at 537-38.
60 For example, aside from juvenile justice, there are numerous examples of crimi-
nal and civil intersection in the domestic relations realm. Family protective orders,
which are "civil," are issued every day in family courts, but violations of them often
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amount of literature has described these themes.
1. Litigants in Family Court
Family Court litigants are generally poor. 2 People of color
make up a disproportionately high number of litigants in Family
Court.6 3 Many of these people are pro se.61
In a survey conducted by the New York State Unified Court
System, 84% of self-represented litigants in Family Court reported
being people of color. 5 Significantly, only seven percent of the pro
se litigants in the New York survey identified themselves as white, as
compared to ninety-two percent that identified as African-Ameri-
result in jail time. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.4 (2016). Non-custodial parents are
also incarcerated on a daily basis for failure to pay civil child support orders. See Child
Support and Incarceration, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.
ncsl.org/research/human-services/child-support-and-incarceration.aspx [https://per
ma.cc/VJ5E-UPE3] (last updated Feb. 10, 2016).
61 See, e.g., Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to justice in the Poor People's
Courts, 22 GEo. J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 473, 487 (2015) (footnotes omitted) (" [T]oday
there remain many variations among family courts in terms of organization and ad-
ministration, there nonetheless exists a shared institutional history and culture
among family courts. This includes a common origin and philosophy that manifest in
three interrelated features: interventionism (e.g., use of social workers and medical
and mental health professionals to conduct evaluations of litigants), informalism
(e.g., simplification of procedures and forms, and efforts to resolve disputes outside
of the litigation process), and intersecting systems, including the enduring interrela-
tionship of criminal and civil procedures in family courts.").
62 In West Virginia in 2001, some estimate that 90-95% of family law litigants fell
below the poverty level. Warren R. McGraw, Family Court System Awarded $1.3 Million
Federal Grant to Help Families, W. VA. LAW., Oct. 2001, at 8, 8; see alsoJoy S. Rosenthal,
An Argument for Joint Custody as an Option for all Family Court Mediation Program Partici-
pants, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 127, 132-33 (2007) (citing OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF
ADMIN. JUDGE FOR JUSTICE INITIATIVES, SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN THE NEW YORK
CITY FAMILY COURT AND NEW YORK CITY HOUSING COURT 3-4 (2005)) ("It is well docu-
mented that most people who appear in New York City's Family Courts are poor peo-
ple of color. According to the New York State Unified Court System's Office of the
Deputy Chief Administrative Judge for Justice Initiatives (DCAJ-JI), 84% of self-repre-
sented litigants in New York Family and Housing Courts are people of color, and 83%
reported a household income of under $30,000 and 57% reported household income
of under $20,000.").
63 See Rosenthal, supra note 62, at 132 (explaining that a New York City Family Law
study found that 84% of self-represented litigants in New York State Unified Courts
are people of color).
64 Id.; see also Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant's Struggle for Access to justice:
Meeting the Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REv. 36, 36 (2002) (foot-
notes omitted) ("The surge in pro se litigation, particularly in the family courts of
every common law country, is reported in official reports and anecdotally by judges
and court managers and in systematic studies."); Gerald W. Hardcastle, Adversarialism
and the Family Court: A Family Court Judges Perspective, 9 U.C. DAVISJ. JUV. L. & POL'Y 57,
121, 121 n.152 (2005) ("The family court has invited the pro se litigant. The pro se
litigant has accepted the invitation in droves.").
65 Rosenthal, supra note 62, at 133.
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can or Hispanic.6 6 This explains why, according to family court
lore,67 while visiting a Philadelphia family court, a lawyer from
Apartheid-era South Mrica asked, " [w]here's the white juvenile
court?""
2. Exploding Dockets
Family Courts are also notorious for being overcrowded, un-
derfunded, and understaffed, by both judges and support staff. 9
Each year a higher proportion of civil cases across the country in-
volve family problems.7 o In the last few years, domestic relations
cases alone made up between 25% and 30% of all state trial court
filings." In 1995, the National Center for State Courts emphasized
that domestic relations cases were the "largest and fastest-growing
segment of state court civil caseloads."7 2 In 2013, state trial courts
heard approximately 5.2 million cases involving domestic rela-
66 Id. at 131 n.10.
67 This story was related to Martin Guggenheim, renowned family and child wel-
fare scholar, by one of his colleagues, Bob Schwartz. Id. at 133-34. Professor Guggen-
heim repeated this story at CUNY School of Law's 2003 Symposium. Symposium, The
Rights ofParents With Children in Foster Care: Removals Arisingfrom Economic Hardship and
the Predicative Power of Race, 6 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 61, 72-73 (2003) ("One cannot address
the subject of children in foster care in the United States, and especially in New York
City, without staring at a shocking truth of a system that a veritable Martian couldn't
help but recognize to be apartheid.").
68 Rosenthal, supra note 62, at 134.
69 Ross, supra note 41, at 5.
70 See Hill, supra note 44, at 544 n.64 ("Family Court caseloads are growing faster
than caseloads of other courts; caseloads tripled between 1980 and 2000.").
71 See, e.g., DAVID W. NEUBAUER & STEPHEN S. MEINHOLD, JUDICIAL PROCESS: LAW,
COURTS, AND POLITICS IN THE UNITES STATES 90 (6th ed. 2013) ("Domestic relations
cases account for about 30 percent of case filings. In recent years, the percentage of
domestic relations cases has remained relatively unchanged."); Patricia G. Barnes, It
May Take a Village. . . Or a Specialized Court to Address Family Problems, A.B.A. J., Dec.
1996, 22, 22 ("Together, juvenile and domestic relations cases comprise more than 30
percent of the civil docket in state courts."). In terms of aggregate caseload distribu-
tion, however, domestic relations cases make up between five and six percent of civil
dockets. See ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING
THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW OF 2013 STATE COURT CASELOADs 7 (2015),
http://www.courtstatistics.org/-/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/
EWSCJCSP2015.ashx [https://perma.cc/L6AS-G6NS] [hereinafter LAFOUNTAIN ET
AL., 2013 STATE COURT CASELOADS]; see also ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT'L CTR.
FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2009
STATE COURT CASELOADs 4 (2011), http://www.courtstatistics.org/flashmicrosites/
csp/images/csp2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/QF9B-N8VA].
72 ANDREW I. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY: INTERDISCIPLINARY MOD-
ELS FOR DIVORCING FAMILIES 38 (2004). But see LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., 2013 STATE COURT
CASELOADS, supra note 71, at 4 (noting that state domestic relations caseloads have
declined about 10% since 2004).
214
2016]INEQUITY IN PRIVATE CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION 215
tions." Judicial appointments lag behind. 4 Referees (attorneys
who are notjudges) are used to preside over cases across the coun-
try.75 In other words, " [jIudges in such courts at best merely keep
cases moving along[.]"7 6 For example, "[i]n Chicago, each judge
hears sixty cases a day."" The average Brooklyn Family Court case
receives "slightly over four minutes before a judge on the first ap-
pearance, and a little more than 11 minutes on subsequent appear-
ances[.]" 7"Across the country, because of lack of staffing and
turnover, record keeping is described as "primitive" and disorga-
nized." "Family courts in most states conjure up overcrowded facil-
ities lacking the veneer of civility . .. ..
3. Status and Reputation in the Legal Profession
As discussed above, most litigants in Family Court are pro se. If
they have representation, it is court-appointed, but very few juris-
dictions appoint lawyers for indigent parties on private family mat-
ters." Moreover, family law and court appointments are not areas
73 LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., 2013 STATE COURT CASELOADS, supra note 71, at 7.
74 See Rosenthal, supra note 62, at 131 (footnotes omitted) ("Although filings have
increased steadily, the number of Family Court judges in New York City (47) has not
changed since 1991.").
75 See Hill, supra note 44, at 532 ("[In New York Family Court,] practices include
officially sanctioned shortcuts like the ever-expanding use of court attorney referees
to preside over cases .... ); id. at 532 n.12 (citing Merril Sobie, Practice Commenta-
ries, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 121 (McKinney 2006)) ("The use of court-attorney referees
to address exploding caseloads is not unique to the New York City Family Court. In
part because of the legislature's failure to authorize additional judges, family courts
throughout the state have relied on these non-judicial employees.").
76 Ross, supra note 41, at 11.
77 Id.
78 John Sullivan, ChiefJudge Announces Plan To Streamline Family Court, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 25, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/25/nyregion/chief-judge-an
nounces-plan-to-streamline-family-court.html [https://perma.cc/HTJ8-B2VU]; For
more about the persistent problems of New York City's Family Courts, see ANNIE E.
CASEY FOUND., ADVISORY REPORT ON FRONT LINE AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICE 44-48
(2000), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED439189.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C46-
XRKL].
79 Ross, supra note 41, at 11.
8 Id. at 5; see also Hill, supra note 44, at 531 ("That the Family Court is ill-equipped
to address the needs of the hundreds of thousands of cases handled therein is not
news.").
81 For example, in Virginia, parties in private civil custody matters are not entitled
by statute or in practice to court-appointed lawyers if they are indigent. The only
indigent parties who are entitled to court appointed lawyers for civil family matters in
Virginia are non-custodial parents who are facing jail time as a result of failure to pay
child support, and parents in termination of parental rights proceedings brought by
the state. New York City is the only jurisdiction the author is aware of in which, by
discretion (not statute), judges appoint counsel for indigent parents in private cus-
tody matters. However, in order to receive a court appointment, the party must be at
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that elite law graduates pursue. Family Courts judges usually have
limited prior judicial experience-appointment or election to
Family Court is often the judge's first judicial post." Family Courts
are "viewed as the 'despised, entry-level "kiddie court"' from which
many judges wish to escape."" Many lawyers, judges, and legal
scholars dismiss cases involving child custody "as having little theo-
retical legal significance."" This perception is not helped by the
fact that, for various reasons, 6 the rules of evidence and ethical
boundaries are ignored in Family Court." As one Judge reports: "I
try to make my courtroom informal. If I think it will help in reach-
ing a settlement, I invite them to my office rather than staying in
the courtroom."" Scholar and practitioner Leah Hill perfectly
summarizes the experience of this author," and likely countless
or below the federal poverty line. See Rosenthal, supra note 62, at 137 (footnote omit-
ted) ("Most working people are not entitled to court-appointed assistance. Although
some unions offer Legal Assistance Programs, free legal services for custody and visita-
tion cases are virtually non-existent for others. Thus, a large income gap separates
people who are eligible for a free, court-appointed attorney, and those who can afford
to pay normal attorney's fees, which, at $250-$500 per hour, could add up to $5,000
or $10,000 per case."). See also generally NATALIE ANNE KNOWLTON ET AL., INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYSTEM, CASES WITHOUT COUNSEL: RESEARCH ON Ex-
PERIENCES OF SELF-REPRESENTATION IN U.S. FAMILY COURT 2, 12-15 (2016), http://
iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/cases without counsel re
search-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/XF2R-KFT5] ("Self-represented litigants in
family court largely desire legal assistance, advice, and representation but it is not an
option for them due to the cost and having other financial priorities. Attorney ser-
vices are out of reach, while free and reduced-cost services are not readily available to
many who need assistance.").
82 See generally David Wilkins et al., Urban Law School Graduates in Large Firms, 36 Sw.
U. L. REv. 433, 489-92 (2007).
83 David J. Lansner, Abolish the Family Court, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 637, 638
(2007) ("The Family Court is generally a place that people want to escape. Judges
move from family court to supreme court and federal court, but almost never the
other way.").
84 Ross, supra note 41, at 5; see also Lansner, supra note 83, at 637 ("The Family
Court was established as an 'inferior court,' and it has lived up (or down) to its
classification.").
85 Ross, supra note 41, at 4.
86 Many judges employ techniques that skirt traditional rules of evidence with
good intentions, trying to accommodate and understand the needs of pro se litigants.
But the lack of decorum and procedure also has negative consequences, some of
which are discussed below, and some of which are beyond the scope of this article. In
any event, the informality of Family Court is striking to any lawyer who practices in
other civil and criminal courts.
87 See generally Jessica Dixon Weaver, Overstepping Ethical Boundaries? Limitations on
State Efforts To ProvideAccess to justice in Family Courts, 82 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2706 (2014).
88 Martha Delaney & Scott Russell, Working with Pro Bono Clients, BENCH & B. MINN.,
Aug. 2005, at 1, 6, http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2005/augO5/law-at
Irg.htm [https://perma.cc/KX9U-76QS] (quoting Hon. Bruce Peterson).
89 The author was a student attorney for Juvenile Rights Practice (JRP) of Legal
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other lawyers and social workers who tread the waters of the New
York City Family Court System each day:
The New York City Family court is a unique breeding ground for
informal practices that perpetuate the appearance of impropri-
ety and undermine litigants' faith in the court. In addition to
the frenzied pace and unimaginable caseloads, the casual famili-
arity that inevitably develops among institutional players and the
legacy of closed proceedings, have shaped the court into a world
unlike any other.o
In many jurisdictions, family matters are heard on a lower
"level" of court than other civil matters (for state-by-state jurisdic-
tional differences see Appendix, infra). For example, in Virginia,
custody and juvenile matters are heard on the same level of court
as small claims and traffic tickets." But even in other states, such as
New York, where Family Courts are on the same level as other trial
courts, they are not given the same respect. 2 The vivid words ofJoy
Rosenthal perfectly encapsulate the author's daily experience in
the five boroughs of New York City.9
Aid in Manhattan Family Court from 2002-2004, then an attorney for JRP in Bronx
Family Court from 2004-2006, and then operated a legal clinic representing children
in Queens Family Court from 2006-2008. During these six years, she also appeared
frequently in Brooklyn Family Court and on occasion in Staten Island Family Court
on Staten Island. The latter was remarkably less crowded and more "white."
90 Hill, supra note 44, at 532 n.11. " [U]nofficially sanctioned practices like ex parte
communications between certain judges and some institutional providers" are charac-
teristic of the informality in Family Court. Id. at 532. The Author also experienced
these practices on a daily basis in her six years practicing in NYC Family Courts. See
generally ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 78. For additional perspectives, see An-
drew White, A Matter of judgment: Deciding the Future of Family Court in NYC, CHILD
WELFARE WATCH, Winter 2005-2006, at 1; Alyssa Katz, Bringing Order to the Court, CHILD
WELFARE WATCH, Winter 2005-2006, at 9, both available at Child Welfare Watch: A Matter
ofJudgment, CTR. FOR N.Y.C. AFFAIRS, http://www.centernyc.org/publicationarchives/
2014/8/21/child-welfare-watch-a-matter-of-judgement [https://perma.cc/VC9Q-
2ANS].
91 While both Courts are technically "District" courts by name, they are wholly dif-
ferent entities. One is a "General District Court" while the other is a "Juvenile and
Domestic Relations District Court." See Virginia's Court System, VIRGINIA'S JUD. SYS.,
http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/home.html [https://perma.cc/U26K-JNNS]
(last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
92 Rosenthal, supra note 62, at 130-31 (noting the differences between Supreme
Court and Family Court in New York, discussing the discrepancy between the two
courts, calling family court the "poor person's court," and noting that Family Court
judges hear more cases than supreme court judges).
93 "New York City Family Court calendars are unbelievably congested. Nearly all
litigants are told to come to court when the court opens at 9:30 A.M. They are not
given specific appointments. It is not unusual for an attorney to appear on ten cases a
day divided among different courtrooms on different floors of the courthouse. Nor is
it unusual for judges to hear over 80 cases each day (sometimes just for administrative
matters, sometimes for actual hearings). With calendars like that, judges must hear
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III. DISCRETIONARY NATURE OF CUSTODY MATTERS
Child custody cases between private parties are known to be
extraordinarily challenging for judges."4 There are a number of
reasons for this. Child custody litigants are emotional and acrimo-
nious." By the time they reach a trial, the parties have usually been
battling over the most important issues of their lives for years. It is
often said that "there are no winners in family court."9" With a
stranger making personal decisions for them, and with hurtful or
embarrassing things inevitably aired in court, parties are unlikely to
be completely happy. On the judge's end, there is fundamental
distrust of the parties." Judges do not feel that they can get an
accurate depiction of the facts from anyone: "There is an almost
knee-jerk reaction by the judges that parents cannot be trusted to
provide the court with all the information necessary to reach the
best resolution of disputes involving children."" Just as most law-
yers shy away from family law, many judges are adverse to custody
whichever case is ready, meaning having all of the litigants, attorneys and witnesses
present and prepared to appear. As a result, litigants often must wait hours for their
case to be heard, even if their case is only on the calendar for return of service....
[B]oth the Bronx and Manhattan courthouses are dilapidated, filthy and depressing.
In the Bronx Family Court, for instance, litigants must often wait in line for hours to
get into the building because the buildings' elevators are routinely broken or being
repaired. Often only one elevator is in use to carry roughly 3,000 people a day up to
the court, where the courtrooms are on the 6th, 7th and 8th floors. If litigants are not
present, their cases cannot be called. As a result, judges must adjourn cases, often for
months at a time, delaying justice and litigants' day in court. This all adds up to give
the family courthouses the milieu of a welfare office rather than a representation of
justice. Once inside the courtroom, cases are often rushed or adjourned, if they are
heard at all. Cases may be adjourned for weeks or even months at a time, and litigants
may be told to come back again and again. This is frustrating for those who have to
work or have child-care responsibilities because they have to take a whole day off each
time they must appear in court, and/or arrange for others to take care of their chil-
dren. Parents have told me that they have used all of their vacation time for the year
waiting in Family Court. One parent told me that she lost herjob because of required
Family Court appearances." Id. at 135-36 (footnotes omitted).
94 "[J]udicial decision-making in these cases is viewed as extremely difficult .... "
Hill, supra note 44, at 534; see also Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best
Interests of the Child Standard in American Juisprudence, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 337, 373
(2008) (noting that the "best interest of the child" standard often does not give the
judge any guidance for her ruling and therefore the judge's decision making process
is unbridled and subjective).
95 Hill, supra note 44, at 534.
96 See, e.g., Prepaing for A Family Court Hearing, LAW OFFICES OF LYNDA L. HINKLE,
http://www.lyndahinkle.com/preparing-for-a-family-court-hearing [https://
perma.cc/Z76Y-QL5R] (last visited Nov. 26, 2016).
97 Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra note 32, at 288.
98 Id.
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cases.99 Indeed, the difficulty of custody cases was demonstrated in
a 2005 Alabama custody ruling that had seven different opinions
written by six judges.1 00
A. Best Interest of the Child
In order to grapple with the exceedingly complicated issues of
custody, in the mid-twentieth century states across the country de-
veloped "best interest of the child" (BIC) tests and incorporated
them into statute.101 Every state now has a BIC statute. 0 2 These
statutes have been the subject of an enormous amount of litera-
ture. As described by Lidman and Hollingsworth:
[The best interest standard] was and still is a highly indetermi-
nate test. It is often devoid of significant legislative guidelines
and instead invites the court to explore the fullest range of the
family's prior history and philosophy of child-rearing. The
courts [become] embroiled in the sifting and winnowing of a
multitude of factors and [are] called upon to exercise exceed-
ingly broad discretion on a case-by-case basis. At the same time
this wide discretion has nearly exempted the trial court from
appellate review. Many authors have argued cogently that the
best interest standard should be revised.1 03
Numerous scholars conclude that BIC statutes provide judges with
little concrete guidance 0 ' and force judges to make inherently bi-
99 Frederica K. Lombard, judicial Interviewing of Children in Custody Cases: An Empiri-
cal and Analytical Study, 17 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 807, 812, 812 n.31 (1984).
100 Exparte G.C.,Jr., 924 So.2d 651 (Ala. 2005).Justice Parker, in his dissent, noted:
"neither the applicable child-custody laws nor the relevant legal precedents appear to
be particularly unclear or inconsistent. . . . After considerable reflection, I have con-
cluded that the primary cause of the Court's varied and often conflicting opinions in
this case is disagreement over foundational issues that underlie the more visible cus-
tody issues." Id. at 674 (Parker, J., dissenting). His dissent quite competently proceeds
to set out those foundations.
101 Julia Halloran McLaughlin, The Fundamental Truth About Best Interests, 54 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 113, 117, 117 n.19 (2009); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (2012); N.Y.
Dom. REL. L. § 70 (McKinney 1988).
102 McLaughlin, supra note 101, at 117, 117 n.19.
103 Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra note 32, at 289-90 (footnotes omitted).
104 June Carbone, Child Custody and the Best Interests of Children-A Review of From
Father's Property To Children's Rights: The History of Child Custody in the United States, 29
FAM. L.Q. 721, 723 (1995) (book review) ("Even putting aside the possibility ofjudi-
cial bias,judges lack a basis on which to evaluate the best interests of a particular child
in the absence of guiding principles."). For example, these are the factors Virginia's
statute lists, with no other guidance in how to use or rank them: "1. The age and
physical and mental condition of the child, giving due consideration to the child's
changing developmental needs; 2. The age and physical and mental condition of
each parent; 3. The relationship existing between each parent and each child, giving
due consideration to the positive involvement with the child's life, the ability to accu-
rately assess and meet the emotional, intellectual and physical needs of the child; 4.
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ased decisions. 10 5
B. Unclear and Controversial Role of Guardians ad Litem
Because of the gravity and difficulty of making custody deci-
sions, in the mid-twentieth century family courts and legislatures
developed another "tool": the guardian ad litem ("GAL").`o0 Again,
an enormous amount of literature has been written about the am-
biguous and highly controversial role of the GAL in private child
custody disputes, 0 ' which is beyond the scope of this article. Suf-
fice it to say that no consensus exists on either the duties of the
guardian ad litem or the form of advocacy one should use.108 In
The needs of the child, giving due consideration to other important relationships of
the child, including but not limited to siblings, peers and extended family members;
5. The role that each parent has played and will play in the future, in the upbringing
and care of the child; 6. The propensity of each parent to actively support the child's
contact and relationship with the other parent, including whether a parent has unrea-
sonably denied the other parent access to or visitation with the child; 7. The relative
willingness and demonstrated ability of each parent to maintain a close and continu-
ing relationship with the child, and the ability of each parent to cooperate in and
resolve disputes regarding matters affecting the child; 8. The reasonable preference
of the child, if the court deems the child to be of reasonable intelligence, understand-
ing, age and experience to express such a preference; 9. Any history of family abuse as
that term is defined in § 16.1-228 or sexual abuse. If the court finds such a history, the
court may disregard the factors in subdivision 6; and 10. Such other factors as the
court deems necessary and proper to the determination." VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3
(2012). For other critiques of the factor-based BIC approach, see, for example, Jon
Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1987); LindaJellum, Parents Know Best: Revising Our Approach to Parental Custody Agree-
ments, 65 OHIo ST. L.J. 615 (2004); Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication:
Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 226-27
(1975).
10 Kohm, supra note 94, at 337 (quoting MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG
WITH CHILDREN's RIGHTS 40 (2005)) ("The best interests standard necessarily invites
the judge to rely on his or her own values and biases to decide the case in whatever
way the judge thinks best. Even the most basic factors are left for the judge to figure
out.").
106 See generally Richard Ducote, Guardians Ad Litem in Private Custody Litigation: The
Case for Abolition, 3 Loy. J. PUB. INT. L. 106, 109-12 (2002) (discussing the history and
background of guardians ad litem).
107 See, e.g., id.; Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra note 32; Martin Guggenheim, The
Right to Be Represented But Not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59
N.Y.U. L. REV. 76 (1984).
108 See, e.g., JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PRO-
CEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS 40-41 (3rd ed. 2007) ("I had expected
to find a discrete number of prevailing models on representing children and thought
that I might be able to present sets of minority and majority views on how the role had
spontaneously evolved in the different states as a result of the sudden requirement of
guardians ad litem in CAPTA. In the end we could find no trends; not even two states
matched in theory and practice."); Barbara A. Atwood, Representing Children Who Can't
or Won't Direct Counsel: Best Interests Lawyering or No Lawyer at All?, 53 ARIz. L. REV. 381,
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some states a guardian ad litem is not even an attorney or advocate
at all.1 o
The guardian ad litem has been defined as any and all of the
following: a court-appointed investigator who makes recommenda-
tions to the court about who should have custody; a lawyer who
represents a child; an advocate for the "best interest" of the chil-
dren; and a facilitator/mediator.o The GAL is sometimes called
the "eyes and ears of the court."' In some states, GALs are al-
lowed to provide facts and opinions to the court without taking the
witness stand or being subject to cross-examination.1 1 2 Conse-
quently, everything they are asked to report to the court about
their conversations with children and parents is hearsay. GALs
serve "a quasi-judicial role . . . cloaked in judicial immunity."11
Because of this role, parents' attorneys advise their clients to
be cooperative with GALs, as GALs' recommendations carry a tre-
mendous amount of weight." But many scholars consider it para-
doxical that the court appoints a GAL because of the court's
inherent distrust of parents (discussed above)," yet then the GAL
invariably gathers most of her "facts" and forms her opinions based
on interviews with parents. 1 1 6
The GAL essentially serves as an expert witness without any
expert qualifications and without having to be a witness. First of all,
386-403 (2011); Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: It Is the "Right"
Thing To Do, 27 PACE L. REv. 869, 876-85 (2007).
109 See, e.g., CONN. R. Sup. CT. FAM. § 25-62 (2016) ("Unless the judicial authority
orders that another person be appointed guardian ad litem, a family relations coun-
selor shall be designated as guardian ad litem. The guardian ad litem is not required
to be an attorney."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.281(H) (LexisNexis 2016) ("If the
court appoints a person who is not an attorney admitted to the practice of law in this
state to be a guardian ad litem, the court also may appoint an attorney admitted to
the practice of law in this state to serve as counsel for the guardian ad litem.").
110 Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra note 32, at 256.
111 Id. at 257.
112 See, e.g., STANDARDS To GOVERN THE PERFORMANCE OF GUARDIANS Ad Litem for
Children S-1 (VA. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 2003), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courtadmin
/aoc/cip/programs/gal/children/gal-performance standardstchildren.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/PFX4-NBL2].
113 Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra note 32, at 257.
114 Id. at 257-58 ("All attorneys will caution their clients to give guardians ad litem
the utmost cooperation because this person's recommendation carries much weight
with the court.").
115 See notes 97-98 and accompanying text, supra.
116 In the Author's experience representing hundreds of parents in child custody
cases where GALs are appointed, the parents are the primary source of facts and
witnesses for the guardian ad litem-investigator. Rarely does the guardian ad litem-inves-
tigator seek out witnesses or information sources other than those identified for them
by the parents.
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a GAL cannot be qualified as an "expert" because there is no such
thing as a lay or attorney "expert" in custody cases."' And unlike
child custody evaluators, who are frequently psychologists," GALs
are not required to possess any specific credentials.' 9 There is not
even a consensus on the appropriate "training" for GALs. 120 In
most states, the way to get on the "list" for appointments is to at-
tend a continuing education course,1 2' agree to accept assign-
ments, and then continue accepting assignments.1 2 2 GALs become
experts by default: "The more often a particular individual per-
forms that role, the more likely that the trial court will rely on him
[or her] as if he [or she] were an expert. "123
117 See Heistand v. Heistand, 673 N.W.2d 541, 550 (Neb. 2004) ("Qualification can-
not occur in guardian ad litem situations because no recognized area of general ex-
pertise with regard to 'custody" or 'child placement' exists." (quoting Lidman &
Hollingsworth, supra note 32, at 275)).
118 See Am. Psychological Ass'n, Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations in Family Law
Proceedings, 65 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 863, 863 (2010), https://www.apa.org/pubs/jour-
nals/features/child-custody.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6W8-HJQ4] ("Psychologists
render a valuable service when they provide competent and impartial opinions with
direct relevance to the 'psychological best interests' of the child. ); see also
Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra note 32, at 275, 275 n.95.
119 Ducote, supra note 107, at 111, 138 (noting that Guardians have no training
requirements and that Guardians are the least trained about domestic violence of any
actors in the civil justice system). See also Hollis R. Peterson, Comment, In Search of the
Best Interests of the Child: The Efficacy of the Court Appointed Special Advocate Model of
Guardian Ad Litem Representation, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1083, 1083, 1083 n.4 (2006)
("Given the nature and importance of this role, it is disturbing that many guardians
ad litem have very little training or education in children and families, receive little
compensation for their work, and often are reported to provide substandard repre-
sentation to their child clients.").
120 Ducote, supra note 106, at 111-16 (describing the many states that formed over-
sight committees to evaluate Guardians and how their recommendations diverged).
121 For example, in Virginia the only mandatory training is one seven-hour CLE
course. See STANDARDS To GOVERN THE APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS Ad Litem Pursuant
to § 16.1-266, Code of Virginia. § I(B) (1) (VA. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 2015), http://
www.courts.state.va.us/courtadmin/aoc/cip/programs/gal/children/
gal-standardschildren.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CW9-U7C2]. See generally Nat'l Coun-
cil of Juvenile & Family Court Judges, Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: Representation as a
Critical Component of Effective Practice, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BULL., Mar. 1998, 1, 70-75,
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/Digitization/194267NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V5LC-XTPS].
122 This is the Author's experience of "getting on the list" as a court appointed
attorney in New York and Virginia, and has been reported to me by my colleagues in
many other states.
123 Coffey v. Coffey, 661 N.W.2d 327, 341 (Neb. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Lidman &
Hollingsworth, supra note 32, at 276-77).
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IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE JURISDICTIONAL DIFFERENCES ON
CUSTODY MATTERS
Because of the ambiguous and discretionary nature of child
custody law and practice, what type of court decides a particular
case truly makes a difference. This is not the same as saying it mat-
ters which judge you get. And this is not just because Family Courts
have a different physical and cultural atmosphere, as described
above, from other trial courts. There are statutory and common
law differences between Family Courts and other trial courts. Two
states, New York and Virginia, exemplify this.
A. New York
The contrasting cultures of New York Supreme Court and
Family Court12' have been described above and in countless arti-
cles by scholars and practitioners over the past thirty-plus years.125
In fact, it has been almost twenty years since the revered Chief Jus-
tices of New York's highest court, the Hon. Judith Kaye and the
Hon. Jonathan Lippman, published a scathing report on the state
of New York's Family Court system and proposed vast improve-
ments to Family Court, including streamlining all domestic rela-
tions matters.1 2 6 Under Chief Justice Kaye's proposal, matrimonial
matters would be heard in the same place as other family mat-
ters.12 ' But nothing has happened in those twenty years, despite
repeated calls for reform.1 28
124 New York's version of "circuit court" in other states is called Supreme Court. It
is the trial-level court of general jurisdiction in the New York State Unified Court
System. It is vested with unlimited civil and criminal jurisdiction. Despina Hartofilis &
Kimberly McAdoo, Reply, Separate But Not Equal: A Call for the Merger of the New York
State Family and Supreme Courts, 40 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 657, 657 (2007).
125 See, e.g., id.; Hill, supra note 44; Caroline Kearney, Pedagogy in a Poor People's
Court: The First Year of a Child Support Clinic, 19 N.M. L. REV. 175 (1989).
126 Judith S. Kaye & Jonathan Lippman, New York State Unified Court System: Family
justice Program, 36 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 144, 145 (1998) ("[We propose] a
constitutional amendment that will fundamentally restructure the trial court system in
New York and create a Unified Family Division. ). This proposal never moved
forward.
127 Id. at 145, 147.
128 See, e.g., ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 78, at 49-51;JULIA VITULLO-MARTIN &
BRIAN MAXEY, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, NEW YORK FAMILY COURT: COURT USER PERSPEC-
TIVEs 20-21 (2000), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/
nyfamilycourt.pdf [https://perma.cc/866F-M868]; CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, NEW
YORK CITY FAMILY COURT: BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (2002),
http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/blueprinl.pdf [https://perma.
cc/RBZ2-GFQ7].
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1. Different Rules & Procedure
First of all, as discussed in the introduction, the rules of New
York Family Court and Supreme Court are different.1 2' This has
been clearly stated and upheld by appellate courts. 3 o One major
difference between these two courts is the lack of requirement of a
preliminary conference in family court."' Therefore, non-marital
families have fewer opportunities for settlement of their custody
issues, increasing the probability that a judge (with the help of
other outside parties, discussed further below) will make the ulti-
mate decisions about a family's life.
There are also a number of other procedural differences.
There are rarely depositions in New York family court,1 2 meaning
all evidence is a surprise. Because there is no pre-trial opportunity
to explore the evidence, it is more likely for traumatic and embar-
rassing things to be disclosed in open court.' The lack of deposi-
129 Compare Uniform Civil Rules for the Supreme Court and the County Court, N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 22, §§ 202.1-.71, with Uniform Rules for the Family Court,
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.22, §§ 205.1-.86.
130 See Lansner, supra note 83, at 642, 642 n.21 ("These due process violations are
compounded by the lack of effective appellate review. The appellate courts have
made review largely meaningless, often ignoring pervasive violations of the Constitu-
tion, New York statutory and decision law, and rules of evidence as harmless error.").
For examples of appellate court case law on the role of law guardians, see Nancy S.
Erikson, The Role of the Law Guardian in a Custody Case Involving Domestic Violence, 27
FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 817, 824-25, nn.32-35 (2000).
131 See Erikson, supra note 130, at 821.
132 This assertion is based on the Author's experience. Although discovery is per-
mitted in New York Family Court custody proceedings, because the proceedings are
designated special proceedings, discovery must be requested and the movant bears
the burden of proving that "the requested discovery was necessary and that providing
the requested discovery would not unduly delay [the] proceeding[.]" Bramble v.
N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 4 N.Y.S.3d 238, 240 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015); accord In re Dominick
R. v. Jean R., 2005 WL 1252573, *3 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. Feb. 14, 2005) ("Custody proceed-
ings brought pursuant to the Family Court Act are 'special proceedings' rather than
'actions' and, as such, are governed by Article 4 of the CPLR. Unlike CPLR 3102(b),
which provides for 'disclosure by stipulation or upon notice without leave of court,'
CPLR 408 specifically provides that 'leave of court shall be required for disclosure' in
a special proceeding.").
133 The embarrassment may be compounded by the fact that matters regarding
juveniles are open to the public in N.Y. Family Court. See Alan Finder, Chief Judge in
New York Tells Family Courts to Admit Public, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 1997), http://
www.nytimes.com/1997/06/19/nyregion/chief-judge-in-new-york-tells-family-courts-
to-admit-public.html [https://perma.cc/TGU9-GLMJ]. But see William Glaberson,
New York Family Courts Say Keep Out, Despite Order, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2011), http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/11/18/nyregion/at-new-york-family-courts-rule-for-public-ac
cess-isnt-heeded.html [https://perma.cc/ADP6-D62V]. Even if these proceedings
were not open to the public, there are still judges, caseworkers, and witnesses present
to hear family intimacies. See New York City Family Court Overview, NYCOURTS.GOV,
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tions further decreases the likelihood of settlement for families. 3
Written opinions are rare in Family Court,1 5 aside from those
drafted on forms immediately following a hearing. 6
2. Use of Child's Attorneys in New York Family Court
Another major difference is the appointment of "child's attor-
neys" (the rough equivalent of GALs, and previously called "Law
Guardians") in New York Family Court, which does not occur in
Supreme Court."' Although the Family Court Act does not ex-
pressly mandate appointment of child's attorneys in custody cases,
judges in New York City assign them to every case.' The author is
not personally aware of the practices in Upstate New York; 39 how-
ever, it is safe to assume that the child's attorneys are appointed in
custody cases with frequency. This is because child's attorneys are
present in almost every other case in New York Family Court4 o and
https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/family/overview.shtml [https://perma.cc/
6BDZ-T6UX] (last visited Nov. 27, 2016).
134 Without discovery or depositions, the parties must resort to trial.
135 Kim Susser, Weighing the Domestic Violence Factor in Custody Cases: Tipping the Scales
in Favor of Protecting Victims and Their Children, 27 FoRDiA URB. L.J. 875, 884 (2000).
136 E.g., Family Court Forms, NYCOURTS.GOV, http://www.nycourts.gov/forms/
familycourt [https://perma.cc/FJH7-Q523] (last updated Jan. 3, 2013).
137 N.Y. Family Court Act section 241 states that "minors who are the subject of
family court proceedings or appeals in proceedings originating in the family court
should be represented by counsel of their own choosing or by assigned counsel." N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 241 (McKinney 2010). As a practicing attorney in New York, the Au-
thor was called a "law guardian" for many years, but the terminology was changed to
"child's attorney" or "attorney for the child" in all statutes by a 2009 bill. Assemb.
7805, 2009 Leg., 232nd Sess. (N.Y. 2010). Prior court opinions and literature used the
"law guardian" term, and the transition to the new terminology is still occurring in
practice.
138 This assertion is based on the Author's experience. The Children's Law Center
("CLC") in Brooklyn is contracted to take on custody cases in New York City. Legal
Aid and Lawyers for Children also take some cases.
139 The author did take occasional cases in Nassau County Court, and this was the
practice there, too.
140 See Nolfo v. Nolfo, 149 Misc.2d 634, 635 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) ("Historically, law
guardians are appointed in Family Court abuse and neglect proceedings where the
rights of children in delinquency proceedings (Article 3), supervision proceedings
(Article 7) and child protective proceedings (Article 10) are at issue. Proceedings to
terminate parental rights under Social Services Law section 384-b, and to place chil-
dren in protective custody under Family Court Act section 158 and to continue chil-
dren in placement or commitment under Family Court Act section 249(a) all require
the appointment of a law guardian to protect the interests of the subject children.");
see also In re Orlando F., 40 N.Y.2d 103, 112 (1976) ("Consequently, although no stat-
ute currently so provides, we hold that, in the absence of the most extraordinary of
circumstances, at the moment difficult to conceptualize, the Family Court should di-
rect the appointment of a Law Guardian in permanent neglect cases to protect and
represent the rights and interests of the child in controversy.").
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can quickly be called to a case." Child's attorneys' offices are lo-
cated inside New York Family courthouses. 1 2
This stands in stark contrast to Supreme Court, which is not
subject to the Family Court Act." Child's attorneys are also not
part of the daily life in Supreme Court. In fact, courts have indi-
cated that child's attorneys are unnecessary in matrimonial ac-
tions." As one court concluded, "the appointment of law
guardians in matrimonial actions is comparatively rare. Counsel
cites but one reported case . . . in which a law guardian was ap-
pointed in a divorce action. . . . The court there found a clear dan-
ger to the children, which justified the appointment of a law
guardian."'
To be clear, the author is not necessarily opposed to ap-
pointing law guardians in private custody matters. This author, a
former law guardian,1 6 certainly endorses the appointment in
child protective matters, using the New York standards of client-
directed advocacy.' But appointing law guardians in private cus-
tody matters is an entirely different substantive issue." In private
custody matters, the state has not made any allegations against par-
ents or intervened in family life against the will of the child and/or
parents."' In private custody matters, the parents retain legal cus-
tody and therefore decision-making power over their children.
Child preferences regarding parents are analyzed differently and
141 This is again based on the Author's experience. Note that CLC only represents
children in custody cases.
142 This is true in all five boroughs of New York City and also in Westchester
County, New York. In other parts of the country, the same is true: in Denver, Colo-
rado, the Colorado Office of the Child's representative is located at 1300 Broadway
Street, which is the courthouse in Denver. This is also true in Salt Lake City, Utah
(450 State St, Salt Lake City, UT 84114), as well as in Fayetteville, North Carolina (117
Dick Street Fayetteville, NC 281348).
143 Robert M. Elardo, Equal Protection Denied in New York to Some Family Law Litigants
in Supreme Court: An Assigned Counsel Dilemma for the Courts, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1125,
1125-27 (2002) (noting that the Family Court Act does not apply in supreme court
and therefore that the right to counsel in the Family Court Act for indigent parents is
unavailable in supreme court).
144 Nolfo, 149 Misc.2d at 635 ("Family Court Act section 249 does not mandate such
an appointment in divorce actions in which a custody dispute is but one of the ele-
ments in controversy.").
145 Id. at 636.
146 As noted, the Author was a law guardian in New York State from 2004-2006.
147 Rules of the Chief Judge, N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REGs. tit.22, § 7.2(d) (2) ("If the
child is capable of knowing, voluntary and considered judgment, the attorney for the
child should be directed by the wishes of the child, even if the attorney for the child
believes that what the child wants is not in the child's best interests.").
148 See Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra note 32, 293-94, 304-06.
149 Cf id. at 293-94 (describing the state's role in abuse and neglect proceedings).
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given different weight than in child protective matters.1 50
In any case, no matter what one's position on the use of law
guardians in private custody matters, the bottom line is that law
guardians are regularly appointed in New York Family Court on
custody matters, but not in Supreme Court.1 5 1 Why should unmar-
ried parents and their children be treated differently than married
ones?
3. Use of Court Ordered Investigations by ACS in Family
Court
Another enormous difference between New York Family Court
and Supreme Court is the use of court-ordered, non-forensic evalu-
ations, 52 which are done, in the case of New York City, by the
state's child protective agency.1 5' The Family Court Act, again, au-
thorizes this.1 5' The practice is so common that it is explained to
clients and the public on numerous law firm websites.15 5 The par-
150 Martin Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need for Counsel for Children in Custody, Visi-
tation and Child Protection Proceedings, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 299, 334, 341 n.179 (1998);
see also Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for Children,
64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1399, 1428-29 (1996).
151 See notes 137-145 and accompanying text, supra.
152 Non-forensic evaluations are those not done by a qualified "expert" such as a
child custody evaluator. For details on child custody evaluators, see Alan M. Jaffe &
Diana Mandeleew, Essentials of a Forensic Child Custody Evaluation, L. TRENDS & NEWS
(Am. Bar Ass'n, Chicago, Ill.), Spring 2011, http://www.americanbar.org/content/
newsletter/publications/law trendsnews-practice-area_e_newsletterhome/2011L
spring/forensiccustody-evaluation.html [https://perma.cc/2WYP-BJRU].
153 Hill, supra note 44, at 539.
154 Id. at 539, 539 n.46 (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit.22, § 205.56(a) (1)
(2006) ("(a) The probation service or an authorized agency or disinterested person is
authorized to, and at the request of the court, shall interview such persons and obtain
such data as will aid the court in: (1) determining custody in a proceeding under
section 467 or 651 of the Family Court Act[.]")).
155 See, e.g., Court Ordered Investigations in NY Family Court Cases, SPODEK LAW GROUP:
LEGAL BLOG (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.spodeklawgroup.com/court-ordered-investi-
gations-in-ny-family-court-cases [https://perma.cc/YM7D-24JF] ("In a litigated cus-
tody or visitation case, the parties are often subject to forensic investigations. These
are mental health investigations of the parties to the litigation and their collateral
contacts. In addition to the forensic reports, the parties might also be asked to submit
to court ordered investigations ('COT'.) These are court ordered investigations of the
parties, and their homes [sic] and can be done by the Administration for Children's
Services ('ACS'), the Probation Department and other third party agencies that are
affiliated with the New York Family Court system."); Law & Mediation Office of Dar-
ren M. Shapiro, P.C., How Are Child Custody Cases Affected by Abuse and Neglect Claims?,
LONG ISLAND FAM. L. & MEDIATION BLOG (May 31, 2014), http://www.longislandfam
ilylawandmediation.com/2014/05/31/child-custody-cases-effected-abuse-neglect-
claims [https://perma.cc/RL77-3N5P] ("In a child custody or parenting time case, a
referee or judge might ask Child Protective Services, for Long Island cases, or Admin-
istration for Children Services, for New York City cases to perform what is called a
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ties are asked to consent to the investigation and allow the agency
to report its findings to the court confidentially." 6 The reports are
delivered directly to the judge and made a part of the court file
before the hearing on the merits of the case. 5
This practice is shockingly "problematic on a number of
fronts [,] "' particularly to anyone who has worked within the child
welfare system and to any parent who has feared getting a visit
from CPS. ACS is not a "neutral" investigator; its legal charge is to
investigate abuse and neglect and "protect children.""' Not only
could ACS investigations in private child custody matters lead to
unnecessary interventions, which have not come about by proper
protocol, 6 o but this practice also implies fault"' and demonstrates
lack of respect for Family Court litigants' privacy. This is parallel to
the cultural and physical atmosphere of Family Court, described in
Section III, which gives Family Court litigants the impression that
their family problems are not worthy of respect. Moreover, it is
quite striking that, from the author's experience,'1 2 New York City
Family Court judges are often highly dissatisfied with the investiga-
tions and services that ACS provides.' For Family Court judges to
turn around and use ACS as a reliable and trustworthy gatherer of
"facts" in a private case is ironic and further reinforces the message
that Family Court litigants are not worthy of respect.
Court Ordered Investigation. The investigation's purpose is to determine whether the
children involved in a child custody case are being exposed to abuse or neglect. What
happens in the case is that a CPS or ACS worker will visit and speak with the children
and the parents and make a report back to the court.").
156 Hill, supra note 44, at 537 (citing Kesseler v. Kesseler, 10 N.Y.2d 445, 456
(1962)).
157 Id. at 539-40.
158 Id. at 540.
159 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1011 (McKinney 1970); Hill, supra note 44, at 540,
540 nn.52-53; Mission & Organization, ADMIN. FOR CHILD. SERV., https://
wwwl.nyc.gov/site/acs/about/mission-organization.page [https://perma.cc/W98D-
EQ5S] (last visited Nov. 13, 2016) ("The Administration for Children's Services pro-
tects and promotes the safety and well-being of New York City's children, young peo-
ple, families, and communities by providing excellent child welfare, juvenile justice,
and early care and education services.").
160 For a discussion of proper child abuse reporting protocol, see generally Dale
Margolin Cecka, Abolish Anonymous Reporting to Child Abuse Hotlines, 64 CATH. U. L.
REv. 51, 56-59 (2014).
161 See Hill, supra note 44, at 540-41 ("To be sure, this atmosphere of suspicion is
not lost on Family Court litigants who understand all too well the power of ACS to
disrupt family life.").
162 This experience is echoed by Leah Hill. Id. at 543 ("As a group, Family Court
judges have an inside view of the deficiencies at ACS and many have voiced their
frustration with the agency's sometimes inept handling of cases in Family Court.").
163 Id. at 543-44.
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In Supreme Court there are no non-forensic evaluations.1 6' A
Supreme Court judge can order a forensic evaluation, but that is
vastly different. A forensic evaluator first has to be qualified as an
expert.1 6' A forensic expert is also subject to rigorous cross-exami-
nation. 166 "This two-tier system begs the question, why do we need
non-expert investigations in Family Court?"1 6 7
B. Virginia
1. JDR Is Not a Court of Record
In Virginia, there are also statutory and practical differences
between custody cases heard in Circuit Court (matrimonial ac-
tions) versus in Juvenile and Domestic Relations ("JDR") Court
(non-matrimonial actions). Interestingly, the Virginia Code pro-
vides the circuit court and JDR court with concurrent jurisdiction
over custody disputes when the parents of the child are separated,
but not divorced.16' This means that unmarried parents must al-
ways go to JDR, but married parents have a choice when they also
intend to file a divorce. In the author's experience, if a party has an
attorney, that party is almost always advised to file their custody
164 Id. at 546 ("[T]here isn't a supreme court rule that parallels the Family Court
rule governing court-ordered investigations.").
165 See Law & Mediation Office of Darren M. Shapiro, P.C., supra note 155 ("Foren-
sics is the word used for investigations and reports made by psychological profession-
als for the court which are then used to aid in deciding how to rule on the dispute.").
See also generally Meredith Kelly et al., Best Practice Guide: Analyzing the Role of Forensic
Evaluators in the New York State Court System, JUST. ACTION CTR. STUDENT CAPSTONE J.,
May 2, 2012, 1, 8-10, http://www.nyls.edu/documents/justice-action-center/stu-
dentcapstonejournal/capl 2kellyetal.pdf [https://perma.cc/NPP2-X4B9] ("The au-
thorizing court rule for the New York Supreme Court is the Uniform Rules for the
New York State Trial Courts ('Uniform Rules'), Part 202.18 titled, 'Testimony of
Court-Appointed Expert Witness in Matrimonial Action or Proceeding,' which allows
courts to 'appoint a psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker or other appropriate ex-
pert to give testimony with respect to custody or visitation."'). N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGs. tit. 22, § 202.18 (2008). See also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 22, §§ 623.1-
.10, 680.1-.11 (outlining rules for mental health professional panels that certify expert
witnesses in the First and Second Judicial Departments).
166 Testimony given by experts in matrimonial actions or proceedings is subject to
the rules of evidence, which allow for cross-examination. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REGs. tit. 22, § 690.12 ("The applicant shall be given an opportunity to call and
cross-examine witnesses and to challenge, examine and controvert any adverse
evidence.").
167 Hill, supra note 44, at 546.
168 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-244(a) (2003) ("[W]hen a suit for divorce has been filed
in a circuit court, . . . the juvenile and domestic relations district courts shall be
divested of the right to enter any further decrees or orders to determine custody,
guardianship, visitation or support . . . and such matters shall be determined by the
circuit court unless both parties agreed to a referral to the juvenile court.").
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petition(s) concurrently with their divorce (when possible) so that
they can have their whole case heard in Circuit Court.
Like family courts in New York, JDR courts in Virginia are sub-
ject to entirely different rules than Circuit Court."' For example,
discovery is only permitted in JDR court if a party makes a motion
to a judge and shows "good cause."17o Even if discovery is granted,
JDR prohibits depositions."' In reality, the author finds that JDR
parties rarely utilize any of the tools of discovery, besides subpoe-
nas duces tecum. Moreover, there are no pre-trial settlement confer-
ences in JDR, unlike in Circuit Court,1 2 and surprise witnesses are
par for the course. A party is not even required to mail a copy of a
witness subpoena to the opposing side. 7
Most shockingly to the author upon admittance to Virginia,
JDR is not a court of record." Whatever happens in JDR can be
appealed "de novo" to Circuit Court." A second trial subjects JDR
litigants to one more layer of litigation and court intervention, and
also requires them to prove their case, and air their troubles-
twice. The numerous differences between courts of record and Cir-
cuit Court in Virginia are beyond the scope of this article. How-
ever, it is important to note that pro se parties rarely actually
"appeal" their cases to Circuit Court because they either do not
know it is an appeal of right, or they do not have the time or en-
ergy to do so."
2. Use of Guardians ad Litem
Another major difference is the use of guardians ad litem
169 VA. SUP. CT. R. 8:1-:22.
170 VA. SUP. CT. R. 8:15(c).
171 Id. ("In all other proceedings, the court may, upon motion timely made and for
good cause, enter such orders in aid of discovery and inspection of evidence as per-
mitted under Part Four of the Rules, except that no depositions may be taken.").
172 See, e.g., Virginia Beach Divorce Pretrial Order, CIR. CT. CITY VA. BEACH, https://
www.vbgov.com/government/departments/courts/circuit-court-judges/Documents/
Divorce% 20Pretrial% 200rder.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8SR-B95P] (last visited Nov.
13, 2016).
173 In practice, the author always does this, but it is not required. VA. SUP. CT. R.
8:13(e) ("This Rule does not apply to subpoenas for witnesses and subpoenas duces
tecum issued by attorneys in civil cases as authorized by Virginia Code §§ 8.01-407 and
16.1-265.").
174 Statutes governing the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Courts are
under Title 16.1, "Courts Not of Record."
175 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-296(A) (2009) ("From any final order or judgment of the
juvenile court affecting the rights or interests of any person coming within its jurisdic-
tion, an appeal may be taken to the circuit court within 10 days from the entry of a
final judgment, order or conviction and shall be heard de novo.").
176 Based off of author's experience and interviews.
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("GALs"). In Virginia, guardians ad litem are statutorily obligated to
investigate for the court and recommend what is in the child's
"best interest" in private custody cases."' They are not subject to
cross-examination." They may submit written reports prior to the
hearing."' In fact, appellate courts uphold and sanction the role
of GAL as a virtual court employee with carte-blanche to investigate,
It is the guardian ad litem who retains the ultimate responsibility
and accountability to the court in carrying out his or her role in
the manner required by the court, as well as the applicable statu-
tory and judicial mandates.... [W] e find no error in the court's
order directing [parents] to permit the guardian ad litem and a
member of his staff to visit their homes on an unannounced or
announced basis, for the purposes stated in the court's order.8 o
Guardians ad litem are appointed by statute in JDR courts."' In
some JDR courts, GALs are appointed in every custody case. 1 2 This
is as opposed to Circuit Courts, where they are appointed infre-
quently." And just as in New York, GALs are usually present in
JDR courthouses all day long (in private offices and attorney work-
rooms) and are immediately available for appointment. GALs do
not have such a presence in Circuit courthouses, where the entire
range of civil and adult criminal matters are heard each day.
The practice of appointing GALs in what are more likely cases
where the litigants are poor is essentially codified in Virginia law.
Virginia Code section 16.1-266(F) provides that the JDR court may
appoint a guardian ad litem for the child in contested custody cases,
177 VA. SUP. CT. R. 8:6.
178 STANDARDS To GOVERN THE PERFORMANCE OF GUARDIANS Ad Litem for Children S-
1 (VA. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 2003), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courtadmin/aoc/cip/
programs/gal/children/gal-performance standards_children.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8JYL-ZWRL].
179 Id. at S-9, S-10.
180 Ferguson v. Grubb, 574 S.E.2d 769, 775 (Va. 2003).
181 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266(F) (2005) ("In all other cases which in the discretion
of the court require counsel or a guardian ad litem, or both, to represent the child or
children or the parent or guardian, discreet and competent attorneys-at-law may be
appointed by the court. However, in cases where the custody of a child or children is
the subject of controversy or requires determination and each of the parents or other
persons claiming a right to custody is represented by counsel, the court shall not
appoint counsel or a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the child or chil-
dren unless the court finds, at any stage in the proceedings in a specific case, that the
interests of the child or children are not otherwise adequately represented.").
182 This is consistent with the author's experience, especially in the City of Rich-
mond JDR Court.
183 This is consistent with the author's experience. The author also conducted in-
terviews with family law attorneys in Fairfax, Norfolk, and Clarke Counties (on file
with the author), which confirmed this practice.
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with the caveat that, if both sides are represented by counsel, the court
must first make a determination that the interests of the child are
"not otherwise adequately represented.""' Therefore, if both par-
ties have counsel (in other words, financial means), the court has
to determine whether a GAL is necessary before appointing one.
The judge cannot automatically appoint a GAL as she would when
both parties are pro se."'
Again, the debate over the appropriateness of the use of GALs
in private custody cases in beyond the scope of the article. How-
ever, it is well documented that GALs are tasked to, and do, make
judgments about families every day."' These "subjective opinions
on the fitness of a parent" are often questionable, at best."' The
reality is that subjective opinions about families are utilized much
more often in JDR than in Circuit Court in Virginia.
V. CONCLUSION
For various cultural and historical reasons, our country has an
extremely varied system for adjudicating matters of the family. As
only uncovered by dozens of calls to clerks' offices, the system is
especially confusing regarding the differences between matrimo-
nial and non- matrimonial custody matters.' These differences in
jurisdiction may not have started out as intentionally biased against
poor people of color, but the disparate impact is clear. Given the
highly subjective and controversial methods for deciding private
custody matters, adding one more layer of potentially biased judg-
ment is unfair to poor families of color. The "best interest" of a
child, however loose of a legal standard, is not different if the
child's parents are married or not. All custody matters in every
state should be heard at the same level of state court.
184 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266(F) (2005).
185 Under Virginia law indigent parties in JDR court are entitled to have counsel
appointed only in cases brought by the state. SeeVA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-266(D) (2)-(3)
(2005). However, there may also be persons who proceed pro se because they do not
meet the indigence threshold, see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-159 (2008), but are nonethe-
less unable to afford private counsel. See note 81 and accompanying text, supra.
186 See, e.g., Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra note 32.
187 See, e.g., Jennifer Sumi Kim, A Father's Race to Custody: An Argument for Multidimen-
sional Masculinities for Black Men, 16 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 32, 34 (2014)
("The adjectives used to describe [Dad] ('unassuming,' 'mild mannered') and
[Mom] ('pushy,' 'difficult') are striking and of little relevancy in a custody case.").
This is also the experience of the author with GALs and was recounted in interviews
with family law attorneys, on file with the author.
188 See notes 53-54 and accompanying text, supra, and Appendix, infra.
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APPENDIX
Separate part
of court for
matrimonial
v. non-matri-
monial
State City contacted cases? Notes
The Domestic Relations Division of the
Circuit Court hears matrimonial cases.
Alabama Birmingham Yes The Family Court Division of the Circuit
Court hears non-matrimonial cases.
The Superior Court hears both matrimo-
nial and non-matrimonial cases.
Alaska Anchorage No Contested cases are heard by judges,
while uncontested cases are heard by
magistrates.
The Family Court Division of the Superi-
Arizona Phoenix No or Court hears both matrimonial and
non-matrimonial cases.
The Domestic Relations Division of the
Arkansas Little Rock No Circuit Court hears both matrimonial
and non-matrimonial cases.
The Family Law Division of the Superior
California Los Angeles No Court hears both matrimonial and non-
matrimonial cases.
The Domestic Relations Division of the
Colorado Denver Yes District Court hears matrimonial cases.
The Juvenile Division of the District
Court hears non-matrimonial cases.
The Family Division of the Superior
Connecticut Bridgeport Yes Court hears matrimonial cases.The Family Support Magistrate Court
hears non-matrimonial cases.
Delaware Wilmington No The Family Court hears both matrimoni-
al and non-matrimonial cases.
The Family Division of the Circuit Court
Florida Jacksonville No hears both matrimonial and non-matri-
monial cases.
The Family Division of the Superior
Georgia Atlanta No Court hears both matrimonial and non-
matrimonial cases.
Hawaii Honolulu No The Family Court hears both matrimoni-
al and non-matrimonial cases.
Idaho Boise No The District Court hears both matrimoni-
al and non-matrimonial cases.
The Domestic Relations Division of the
Illinois Chicago No Circuit Court hears both matrimonial
and non-matrimonial cases.
The Superior Court hears matrimonial
Indiana Indianapolis Yes cases.The Circuit Court hears non-matrimonial
cases.
The Civil Division of the District Court
Iowa Des Moines No hears both matrimonial and non-matri-
monial cases.
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The Family Law Department of the Dis-
Kansas Wichita No trict Court hears both matrimonial and
non-matrimonial cases.
The Family Court Division of the Circuit
Kentucky Louisville No Court hears both matrimonial and non-
matrimonial cases.
The Domestic Division of the Civil Dis-
Louisiana New Orleans No trict Court hears both matrimonial and
non-matrimonial cases.
The Family Division of the District Court
Maine Portland No hears both matrimonial and non-matri-
monial cases.
The Family Division of the Circuit Court
Maryland Baltimore No hears both matrimonial and non-matri-
monial cases.
The Probate and Family Court Depart-
Massachusetts Springfield No ment of the Trial Court hears both mat-
rimonial and non-matrimonial cases.
The Family Division of the Circuit Court
Michigan Grand Rapids No hears both matrimonial and non-matri-
monial cases.
The Family Court Division of the District
Minnesota St. Cloud No Court hears both matrimonial and non-
matrimonial cases.
Mississippi Jackson No The Chancery Court hears both matri-
monial and non-matrimonial cases.
The Family Court Division of the Circuit
Missouri Kansas City No Court hears both matrimonial and non-
matrimonial cases.
Montana Billings No The District Court hears both matrimoni-l N al and non-matrimonial cases.
Nebraska Omaha No The District Court hears both matrimoni-
al and non-matrimonial cases.
The Family Division of the District Court
Nevada Las Vegas No hears both matrimonial and non-matri-
monial cases.
The Family Division of the Circuit Court
New Hampshire Manchester No hears both matrimonial and non-matri-
monial cases.
The Dissolution Section of the Family Di-
vision of the Superior Court hears matri-
New Jersey Newark Yes monial cases. The Non-Dissolution Sec-
tion of the Family Division of the Superi-
or Court hears non-matrimonial cases.
The Family Court Division of the District
New Mexico Albuquerque No Court hears both matrimonial and non-
matrimonial cases.
The Supreme Court hears matrimonial
New York New York City Yes cases.The Family Court hears non-matrimonial
cases.
The Family Court Division of the District
North Carolina Charlotte No Court hears both matrimonial and non-
matrimonial cases.
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The District Court hears both matrimoni-
al and non-matrimonial cases.
The Domestic Relations Division of the
Court of Common Pleas hears matrimo-
Ohio Columbus Yes nial cases. The Juvenile Division of the
Court of Common Pleas hears non-matri-
monial cases.
Oklahoma The Family Court Division of the DistrictOklahoma CNo Court hears both matrimonial and non-
matrimonial cases.
The Family Court Division of the Circuit
Oregon Portland No Court hears both matrimonial and non-
matrimonial cases.
The Domestic Relations Branch of the
Pennsylvania Philadelphia No Family Division of the Court of CommonPleas hears both matrimonial and non-
matrimonial cases.
The Domestic Relations Division of the
Rhode Island Providence No Family Court hears both matrimonial
and non-matrimonial cases.
South Carolina Charleston No The Family Court hears both matrimoni-
al and non-matrimonial cases.
South Dakota Sioux Falls No The Circuit Court hears both matrimoni-
al and non-matrimonial cases.
Both the Circuit Court and Chancery
Tennessee Memphis Yes Court hear matrimonial cases. The Juve-
nile Court hears non-matrimonial cases.
The Family Court Division of the District
Texas Houston No Court hears both matrimonial and non-
matrimonial cases.
Utah Salt Lake Cit No The District Court hears both matrimoni-ty al and non-matrimonial cases.
The Family Division of the Superior
Vermont Burlington No Court hears both matrimonial and non-
matrimonial cases.
The Circuit Court hears matrimonial
Virginia Virginia Yes cases. The Juvenile and Domestic Rela-Beach tions District Court hears non-matrimoni-
al cases.
The Family Court Division of the Superi-
Washington Seattle No or Court hears both matrimonial and
non-matrimonial cases.
West Virginia Charleston No The Family Court hears both matrimoni-
al and non-matrimonial cases.
The Family Court Division of the Circuit
Wisconsin Milwaukee No Court hears both matrimonial and non-
matrimonial cases.
The District Court hears both matrimoni-
al and non-matrimonial cases.

AFTERWORD
Matthew L Fraidint
That family defense lawyering has reached a stage of maturity
at which it can be "reimagined," is, well, hard to imagine. Our day
together at CUNY School of Law, and this extraordinary volume,
represent a vision of the future of family defense. The Symposium
and the collection of articles in this volume give but a hint of the
ever-growing strength and vitality of lawyers' commitment to seek-
ing justice for families.
Over the course of the day, more than one hundred attendees
heard from more than a dozen speakers. Speakers included aca-
demics, practicing lawyers, and parents previously entangled in
child welfare who now advocate for change. To fully appreciate the
vision of the future conveyed by Symposium participants and the
authors represented in this volume, we must look to the past to
understand our trajectory and to the present for context. We see
that clinical legal education, legal services, legal scholarship, pol-
icy, and activism all are covered in family defense fingerprints.
Nowadays, no credible conversation can be had, in any realm of
child welfare, without a family defense lawyer in the room. More
and more, the needle is moved throughout child welfare by our
respect for parents and families, and our insistence on justice.
In perhaps the clearest signal of a sea change in the field of
family defense, CUNY's was but one of two symposia centered on
family defense held in the same city in the same week, NYU School
of Law having celebrated just the day before its Family Defense
Clinic's 25th Anniversary Celebration Symposium.' Two separate
symposia convened on the subject of parent representation.
Enough scholars with something to say about family defense to fill
two days' worth of panels and events, hosted by two law schools
renowned nationwide for their cutting-edge clinical education pro-
grams and pursuit of justice.
Indeed, developments in clinical legal education with respect
to family defense have been instrumental in the development of
f Professor of Law, University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School
of Law (UDC-DCSL). Thanks to the CUNY Law Review staff for convening the Sympo-
sium, and for excellent editorial assistance.
1 Family Defense Clinic Celebrates 25 Years Providing Interdisciplinay Family Representa-
tion, N.Y.U. SCH. L. (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/family-defense-
clinic-25th-anniversary [https://perma.cc/YTV7-WQ5A].
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the field and augur well for the future. Establishment in 1991 of
NYU's Family Defense Clinic was followed up by the University of
the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law-17 years
later.2 Since 2008, however, family defense practices have
mushroomed throughout the world of clinical legal education.
This volume alone includes important work by Professor Kara
Finck of the University of Pennsylvania and Professor Amy Mulzer
of Brooklyn Law School. Professor Mulzer's co-author, Tara Urs,
previously served as a law professor and has published several im-
portant pieces in our field. In recent years, representation of par-
ents in child welfare cases has become an important component of
law clinics at the University of Michigan Law School, Howard Law
School, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, and the University of Illi-
nois College of Law. We are more than a handful (yes, in every
sense of the term), and our ranks are growing.
Our law schools produce family defense civil rights lawyers: en-
ergetic, creative, and fierce warriors who admire their clients'
strengths and who know that justice is their clients' due. The new
lawyers minted in these clinical programs understand that some-
thing big can be brewed in family court and that family defense
provides an important pathway for change. Change can be made in
our courtrooms, and justice pursued. New York City alone is home
to three institutional providers with city contracts to serve family
defense clients. The Bronx Defenders,' Brooklyn Defender Ser-
vices,' and Center for Family Representation' are populated by rav-
enously justice-hungry family defense lawyers, whose fervent
advocacy honors the vital nature of this practice. Many of those
lawyers participated in the Symposium and a number are repre-
sented in this volume. Now, in addition to filling criminal defense
courtrooms and pursuing racial and economic justice in education
and through prison reform, servants of justice seek in Family
Court-that most-reviled of venues, long-despised by judges and
lawyers alike-opportunities to make change.
Law graduates looking to family defense as a route to creating
lasting social change now can find a home in the American Bar
2 Katherine S. Broderick, The Nation's Urban Land-Grant Law School: Ensuing jus-
tice in the 21st Century, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 305, 315 (2009).
3 See generally BRONX DEFENDERS, http://www.bronxdefenders.org [https://
perma.cc/L4G8-273Z] (last visited Dec. 4, 2016).
4 See generally BROOKLYN DEFENDER SERVICES, http://bfdp.org [https://perma.cc/
3246-SFB6] (last visited Dec. 4, 2016).
5 See generally CTR. FOR FAM. REPRESENTATION, http://www.cfrny.org [https://
perma.cc/CZR6-GSKR] (last visited Dec. 4, 2016).
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Association's National Alliance for Parent Representation.6 Cele-
brating its 10th anniversary in 2016, the Alliance is a safe harbor
for lawyers across the country who have long known, individually,
that too many families were being broken and too many children
destroyed, too many communities ravaged and too-little justice
done in dependency courtrooms.7 Our colleagues and friends na-
tionally long have labored for little pay and with even less respect.
The louder their cries about the emperors' nakedness, the more
hostile the reaction.
Lawyers across the country who need the favor of trial judges
to secure appointment to cases risk their very livelihoods by insist-
ing that judges follow the law. They risk their livelihoods by insist-
ing that their clients are three-dimensional humans, not
inhabitants of the crass racist stereotypes assigned to them. Lawyers
risk their livelihoods by asking for even a few moments to read
court documents before responding, or a few moments to meet-
let alone to counsel-their clients before helping their clients
make the most important decisions of their lives. Our colleagues
and friends are demeaned and derided for putting the government
to its paces: how many times have we been scolded, in the very
words rejected by the Supreme Court in In Re Gault, that these are
not adversarial proceedings even though it sure felt adversarial
when they took our client's children?
The ABA Alliance is the hub of a movement to turn the tide. It
is a cozy clubhouse for family defense lawyers-small, but ever-ex-
panding. We have a national listserv with hundreds of members,
and we send emails asking each other questions and sharing stories
of outrages and triumphs. Under the Alliance's auspices, we gather
for national conferences every two years. The Alliance sponsors
trainings and influences policy nationwide. The Alliance supports
lawyers in states where we are still mistreated and disrespected-in
6 Parent Representation, AM. BAR Ass'N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
childaw/whatwedo/projects/parentrepresentation.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/3SWS-DK6E].
7 See CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE LAW, AM. BAR Ass'N, ABA NATIONAL PRQJECT TO
IMPROVE REPRESENTATION FOR PARENTS (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content
/dam/aba/administrative/child_1aw/ParentRep/At-a-glance%20final.authcheckdam
.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R8E-A7JC].
8 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967) ("[T]he child was to be 'treated' and 'reha-
bilitated' and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were
to be 'clinical' rather than punitive. These results were to be achieved, without com-
ing to conceptual and constitutional grief, by insisting that the proceedings were not
adversary, but that the state was proceeding as parens patriae."). Gault concerned
juvenile delinquency proceedings.
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other words, just about everywhere-and shines a light on states
who remain, in this day and age, still uncommitted to even ap-
pointing a lawyer for a parent faced with the permanent loss of her
child.' When we are disoriented and fatigued from-as Professor
Martin Guggenheim put it in his 2006 keynote address at the first
ABA parent conference-"being polite to people who do despica-
ble things" to our clients and their children, the ABA Alliance
helps us find each other.
Our role in seeking justice has not escaped the notice of the
National Coalition for Child Protection Reform (NCCPR). o Di-
rected by a non-lawyer, the organization's child-protection plat-
form is built, perhaps improbably, on due process planks. In
NCCPR's "Due Process Agenda," three of its "child protection" rec-
ommendations focus on the irreplaceable value of lawyers."
In contrast to the D.C. City Council member who once told
me that lawyers have ruined child welfare, NCCPR argues that
" [q]uality legal representation must be available to all parents who
must face CPS."1 2 NCCPR agrees with us that lawyers should be
appointed and start working as soon as a child is removed from a
parent's care, and that all lawyers should act like lawyers, instead of
pretending, in the guise of law guardians and guardians ad litem,
that we can guess at a child's best interests." It is a new world when
lawyers infiltrate child protection advocacy and are seen for the
indispensable cleansing agents that we truly are.
More tangible, bricks-and-mortar evidence of our progress
comes in the form of a book, Representing Parents in Child Welfare
9 See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-201(2) (2016) ("If the court determines that a
parent or guardian who is a party in an abuse, neglect or termination of parental
rights proceeding is indigent, the youth court judge may appoint counsel to represent
the indigent parent or guardian in the proceeding.") (emphasis added); Joni B. v.
State, 549 N.W.2d 411, 417-18 (Wis. 1996) ("[A] circuit court should only appoint
counsel after concluding that either the efficient administration of justice warrants it
or that due process considerations outweigh the presumption against such an
appointment.").
10 See generally NAT'L COALITION FOR CHILD PROTECTION REFORM, https://
nccpr.info [https://perma.cc/F7AA-6M7L] (last visited Dec. 4, 2016).
11 RICHARD WEXLER, NAT'L COAL. FOR CHILD PROT. REFORM, CIVIL LIBERTIES WITH-
OUT EXCEPTION: NCCPR's DUE PROCESS AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 5-7
(2015), http://www.nccpr.org/reports/dueprocess.pdf [https://perma.cc/LKS8-
PBG5].
12 Id. at 5.
13 Id. at 13; see also Martin Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need for Counsel for Chil-
dren in Custody, Visitation and Child Protection Proceedings, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 299
(1998).
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Cases: Advice and Guidance for Family Defenders." But it's not just a
book. It is a user's guide, a practice manual for family defense law-
yers. What could be duller than a "how-to-lawyer" book? What
could be less-exotic or more mundane than yet another practi-
tioner's guide, with chapters and sections and sub-sections? The
book is a veritable connect-the-dots collection of best practices. But
in its mundanity, our book is everything. Most importantly, our
standard-issue practice manual means that there is an audience.
That there are lawyers who want to read the book. It means that
there is a large-and-getting-larger community of lawyers who are a
credible force for justice and change.
We have been out in the cold rain and snow for many years,
underpaid and overburdened, victimized by case-appointments
practices that deprive us of dignity and which seek to deprive our
clients of humanity. Now we send a signal that we are real, that We
Cannot Be Messed With. This is a field we love. This is where we
want to be. The book serves notice to prosecutors, to judges, to
other lawyers, to our clients, and even to ourselves, that far from
"ruining" child welfare, we plan to fix it.
As family defense lawyers, we still face degradation and obsta-
cles which pale only in comparison to those faced by our clients.
Our clients are no-less-reviled than ever; the fuel of the "foster
care-industrial complex," to use NCCPR's memorable phrase," re-
mains poverty and racism.1 6 In this volume, Mulzer and Urs's in-
dictment is succinct:
By now, it is well known that the child welfare system dispropor-
tionately touches the lives of families of color, particularly Black
and Native American families. The child welfare system sepa-
rates more children of color from their families and communi-
ties, keeps them separated for longer periods of time, and more
often permanently ends those families by terminating dispro-
portionately more of their legal relationships. It is also well cata-
14 REPRESENTING PARENTS IN CHILD WELFARE CASES: ADVICE AND GUIDANCE FOR FAM-
ILY DEFENDERS (Martin Guggenheim & Vivek S. Sankaran eds., 2015).
15 NAT'L COAL. FOR CHILD PROT. REFORM, ALL-PURPOSE DCYF/ FOSTER CARE-INDUS-
TRIAL COMPLEX EXCUSE CHECKLIST (2010), http://www.nccpr.org/reports/Rlexcuse
checklist95472ri2l.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5P2-8N5Z].
16 See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE
60-74 (2002); Tanya Asim Cooper, Commentary, Race is Evidence of Parenting in
America: Another Civil Rights Story, in CIVIL RIGHTS IN AMERICAN LAW, HISTORY, AND
POLITICS 103-12 (Austin Sarat ed., 2014); ORONDE MILLER & AMELIA ESENSTAD, CTR.
FOR THE STUDY OF SOC. POLICY, STRATEGIES To REDUCE RACIALLY DISPARATE OUTCOMES
IN CHILD WELFARE: A NATIONAL SCAN (2015), http://www.cssp.org/publications/child
-welfare/alliance/Strategies-to-Reduce-Racially-Disparate-Outcomes-in-Child-Welfare-
March-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/DA9E-ETCH].
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loged that, even more than race and Tribal affiliation, poverty is
the single greatest predictor of a child welfare case. The child
welfare system is fully focused on the lives of poor families, and
especially focused on poor families of color. The flip side is that
families with financial means and white families are far more
likely to be left alone by the system despite experiencing the
very same concerns that lead to child welfare intervention for
low-income families of color, such as mental illness, alcoholism,
recreational or habitual drug use, or domestic violence. People
of means are less likely to be touched by the system or to know
people touched by the system.1 7
Subjugation remains the fundamental characteristic of child wel-
fare. There is much work to do.
But in some states, we have slowed the rates of child-remov-
als." We continue to fight against the Adoption and Safe Families
Act's reckless, oppressive destruction of children, families, and
communities." And yes, we publish law review articles and we
gather for conferences and symposia. We have a listserv. We have
that practice manual now, just like housing lawyers and bankruptcy
lawyers and antitrust lawyers. There are jazzed-up lawyers across the
country reading the book voraciously in unstinting effort to be bet-
ter, run further, jump higher. Students dive into family defense in
law school clinics, and, truly against all odds, see family defense as
an inviting career choice. CUNY School of Law, with its grand leg-
acy of service and justice-seeking, gathered us together for a day of
celebration and to look to the future. That is a big deal.
But as we reflect on the past, cheer our progress, and charge
ahead into the future, we must assess the present with hard heads
and clear eyes. We see promise and see also that challenges
remain.
Perhaps the most revealing and important depiction of the
current state of child welfare law and practice can be found by see-
17 Amy Mulzer & Tara Urs, "However Kindly Intentioned": Structural Racism and Vol-
unteer CASA Programs, 20 CUNY L. REV. 23, 26-27 (2017) (in this volume).
18 NYC's foster care population was 16,701 in FY 2008 and had been reduced to
13,112 by FY 2013. MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG ET AL., MAYOR'S MANAGEMENT REPORT 102
(2013), http://www.nyc.gov/html/ops/downloads/pdf/mmr2013/acs.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XA2D-4F54]; similarly, in the District of Columbia, 3,070 children were in
out-of-home care as of September 30, 2003, and 1,085 on September 30, 2015. D.C.
CHILD & FAMILY SERVS. AGENCY, CFSA FACT SHEET: CHILDREN AND YOUTH CFSA SERVES
1 (2016), http://cfsa.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/cfsa/pagecontent/attach
ments/Children%20and%2oYouth%20CFSA%2oStatistics%20July%202016_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7YFJ-HXES].
19 See generally Richard Wexler, Take the Child and Run: How ASFA and the Mentality
Behind It Harm Children, 13 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 435 (2010).
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ing through the eyes of judges. These, after all, are the decision-
makers in our clients' lives. It is the judges who hear our clients or
don't. It is judges who apply law capriciously or fairly, whose ac-
tions vindicate or degrade the Constitution, who resist or are cap-
tured by stereotypes of the low-income women of color who
disproportionately are entangled by governmental interventions. 0
Are judges keeping up with the changing culture being built-
surely, if slowly-by family defense lawyers allied with their clients?
Some of the evidence is positive. Only two months after the
Symposium, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges (NCJFCJ) promulgated new "Enhanced Resource Guide-
lines" for use in child welfare court practice. Although a mixed
bag, there is much to applaud in the Guidelines, which convey the
NCJFCJ's most-current statement of goals, priorities, and recom-
mended practices.
On one hand, the "Key Principles" of these Guidelines are fun-
damentally flawed, arguing that judging in 'juvenile and family
court is specialized and complex, going beyond the traditional role of
the judge.Juvenile court judges, as the gatekeepers to the foster care
system and guardians of the original problem-solving court, must
engage families, professionals, organizations, and communities to
effectively support child safety, permanency, and well-being. "22
Our experience as lawyers suggests to the contrary, namely
that the best decisions can be made by judges who fulfill the tradi-
tional role of judges: hear evidence, find facts, apply the law-in-
cluding by ordering social work agencies to fulfill their roles and
holding them in contempt when they fail to do so. In addition, the
Guidelines are far too sanguine about the purported benefits of
"best interest" guardians ad litem and Court-Appointed Special
Advocates.
Instead, our experience tells us that children and families
would be best served by a genuine adversarial system, not the quar-
ter- and half-measures that have long been the mark of family
20 MILLER & ESENSTAD, supra note 16, at 15-17 (highlighting the need for compre-
hensive and multifaceted efforts to address racial disparities in the child welfare sys-
tem, including by engaging judges).
21 See SOPHIE I. GATOWSKI ET AL., NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT
JUDGES, ENHANCED RESOURCES GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES (2016), http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/%20
NCJFCJ%20Enhanced%2OResource%20Guidelines%2005-2016.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2E6G-P8AP].
22 Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
23 Id. at 43.
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courts. In Ambivalence About Parenting in this volume, Lisa
Beneventano and Colleen Manwell point out that:
Focusing on . . . standards and rules can be especially helpful in
defending a case centered around expressions of ambivalence,
where no actual harm or injury to the child is alleged. In cases
based solely on a parent's expression of parental ambivalence,
the child protective agency is often missing an essential element
of their case: proof the child faced actual harm or imminent risk
of harm.2 4
Would that Beneventano and Manwell's lament about the lawless-
ness of child welfare proceedings were an isolated phenomenon,
limited to the consideration by judges and case workers of expres-
sions of parental ambivalence. But we have heard countless warn-
ings and complaints about the pervasive deviation in child welfare
from the ordinary guideposts of procedural regularity, such as
hearings closed to the press and public, underpaid lawyers,
overburdened judges, lack of rules of evidence, lawyers and CASAs
who purport to know what is "best" for a child-and judges who
undertake activities, such as engaging families, professionals, orga-
nizations, and communities, that are outside their competence.
Nonetheless, the NCJFCJ has long supported process-oriented
positions on some issues-they have supported open courts for
many years, for example.2 ' And fundamental to these Guidelines
are pervasive strands of thought that are consistent with important
principles of our work as lawyers for parents. If implemented
widely, the Guidelines will minimize the harm inflicted on children
and families by the administration of justice.
For example, the Guidelines recognize that, " [jIudicial deter-
minations to remove children from a parent should only be made
based on legally sufficient evidence that a child cannot be safe at
24 Lisa Beneventano & Colleen Manwell, Ambivalence About Parenting: An Overview
for Lawyers Representing Parents in Child Welfare Proceedings, 20 CUNY L. REV. 151, 162
(2017) (in this volume).
25 See generally Anne H. Geraghty & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Unified Family Courts: Tem-
pering Enthusiasm with Caution, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 435, 435-52 (2002); see also Amy
Sinden, "1hy Won't Mom Cooperate? ": A Critique of Informality in Child Welfare Proceedings,
11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339 (1999).
26 The NCJFCJ issued a 2005 resolution urging that "our nation's juvenile and
family courts be open to the public except when the juvenile or family court judge
determines that the hearing should be closed in order to serve the best interests of
the child and/or family members." NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT
JUDGES, RESOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF PRESUMPTIVELY OPEN HEARINGS WITH DISCRETION
OF COURTS TO CLOSE 1 para. 7 (2005), http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/reso
lution%2520no.%25209%2520open%2520hearings.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AFT-
JBBL].
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home."2 ' And, further, it recognizes that "l[jiudges are responsible
for ensuring that parties, including each parent, are vigorously rep-
resented by well-trained, culturally responsive, and adequately
compensated attorneys .. 2. "
Moreover, in a chapter titled "Access to Competent Represen-
tation," the Guidelines insist that:
Because critically important decisions will be made at the very
first hearing, parents should be represented by counsel as early
in the process as possible. Few parents will be able to afford to
hire an attorney on their own. The court should work with coun-
sel who practice before the juvenile and family court to develop
a system for appointment sufficiently in advance of the prelimi-
nary protective hearing to permit meaningful consultation and
preparation.2
The Guidelines say that the "nucleus" of the document itself
are "benchcards" for use prior to and during every child welfare
hearing. 0 The rigor and routine imposed by benchcards can pro-
mote a constructive predictability. And a stunning innovation, with
potentially dramatic significance, is that every benchcard includes
a recommendation for pre-hearing preparation techniques de-
signed to promote internal reflection to prevent bias:
As a measure of recommended practice, to protect against any
institutional or implicit bias in decision-making, judges should
make a habit of asking themselves:
* What assumptions have I made about the cultural iden-
tity, genders, and background of this family?
* What is my understanding of this family's unique culture
and circumstances?
* How is my decision specific to this child and this family?
* How has the court's past contact and involvement with
this family influenced (or how might it influence) my de-
cision-making process and findings?
* What evidence has supported every conclusion I have
drawn, and how have I challenged unsupported
assumptions?
* Am I convinced that reasonable efforts (or active efforts
in ICWA cases) have been made in an individualized way
to match the needs of the family?
* Am I considering relatives as a preferred placement op-
tion as long as they can protect the child and support the
27 GATOWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 14.
28 Id. at 16.
29 Id. at 42.
30 See id. at 20.
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permanency plan?"
The Guidelines' recognition that judges, like all of us, can be
prisoners of our implicit biases, is especially important because of
the same Guidelines' unfortunate doubling-down in the "Key Prin-
ciples" and throughout 2 on a vision of family court in which
judges engage in so many non-judging tasks. When judges do more
and less than simply apply the law-when they call social workers
on the telephone to urge referrals, or contact housing providers to
check on a litigant's housing prospects, or advocate with a drug
treatment provider to find a bed for a litigant-they are doing so
with big hearts and the very best of intentions. But those activities
diminish the already-limited role that law plays in family court pro-
ceedings and erode the quality of information on the basis of
which family court decisions are made.
As Beneventano and Manwell point out, and as we have seen
again and again, the less constrained judges and other humans are
by law and process, the more that stereotypes and biases can creep
in. When judges learn about cases via ex parte phone calls, "train-
ings," and without rules of evidence, the information generated is
less-reliable than that generated the old-fashioned way. There is a
reason that we still, in law school, repeat the hoary maxim that
cross-examination is the greatest legal engine for truth ever
invented."
Unreliable information and limited information are canvases
on which assumptions, guesses, and implicit biases find a home.
For that reason, the benchcards' express recommendations for
methodsjudges can use to combat bias are a very welcome and very
promising development.
We can find, then, in the past decades, unmistakable signs of
progress. But challenges and outrages remain. On the front end of
the child welfare system, the Constitution is flouted by the removal
of thousands of children not in danger, churned in and out of fos-
ter care, removed for a few days and then returned home as if, like
furniture moved from one room to another, no harm was done. 5
And on the back end, thousands of termination proceedings pro-
31 Id. at 67.
32 See generally id. at 14-17.
33 Beneventano & Manwell, supra note 24, at 160-64 (in this volume).
34 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (James H.
Chadbourn et al. eds., rev. 1974).
35 See generally Vivek S. Sankaran & Christopher Church, Easy Come, Easy Go: The
Plight of Children Who Spend Less Than Thirty Days in Foster Care, 19 U. PA. J.L. & Soc.
CHANGE (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author).
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duce "legal orphans," whose birth parents' rights are terminated
but who are never adopted by new parents, and thus must live their
lives without legal parents. 6
In this context, it is of no small moment that NCJFCJ cogently
has articulated commitments to fundamental principles and prac-
tices that create possibilities for change. As family defense lawyers,
it is our privilege and responsibility to work hand-in-hand with our
clients to leverage those commitments.
The Symposium was an occasion to imagine a future. And as
Professor Delgado tells us, we build the future we imagine: "We
participate in creating what we see in the very act of describing
it." 7 The very convening of this Symposium signals that the newly-
imagined future, so brilliantly-described in the pages of this vol-
ume, will be one in which family defense lawyers play an important
role in ensuring that our courts live up to their promises.
36 Lashanda Taylor, Resurrecting Parents of Legal Orphans: Un-Terminating Parental
Rights, 17 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 318, 326-27 (2010).
37 Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2416 (1989).
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